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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the history of self-defense in America, including the right to bear arms, as related to Indian tribes in order to
shed light on how the construction of history affects tribes today. As
shown below, Indians are the original caricatured “savage” enemy
against whom white Americans believed they needed militias and
arms to defend themselves. Since the early days, others have ably documented that the perceived enemies have multiplied to include
1
African Americans, immigrants, and the lower classes. But this has
not meant that Indians have been let off the hook. Instead, they not
only remain saddled with whites’ nightmare images of their savagery,
but they continue to be punished for the popular perception of them
in very concrete ways. Specifically, they are repeatedly and increasingly denied the right to govern on grounds of their untrustworthiness, and it is entirely possible that the lawlessness of Indian reservations has continued as a result of this very racialization.
The Article first examines evidence that the historical meaning of
self-defense in America (including that of the Second Amendment)
was predicated largely on the premise that European, especially English, colonists needed to defend themselves against “savage” Indians.
2
The Article then argues that this cultural myth of white America’s
need to defend itself against Indians obscures the fact that Indians
who engaged in armed conflicts with the United States or the colo3
nies were, in many instances, actually defending themselves and their
homelands from white aggression and encroachment.
1
2

3

See, e.g., David C. Williams, Constitutional Tales of Violence: Populists, Outgroups, and the Multicultural Landscape of the Second Amendment, 74 TUL. L. REV. 387, 469 (1999).
In using the word “myth,” I mean to invoke Richard Slotkin’s definition:
Myths are stories drawn from a society’s history that have acquired through persistent usage the power of symbolizing that society’s ideology and of dramatizing its
moral consciousness—with all the complexities and contradictions that consciousness may contain. Over time, through frequent retellings and deployments as a
source of interpretive metaphors, the original mythic story is increasingly conventionalized and abstracted until it is reduced to a deeply encoded and resonant set
of symbols, “icons,” “keywords,” or historical clichés. In this form, myth becomes a
basic constituent of linguistic meaning and of the process of both personal and social “remembering.”
RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION: THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIER IN TWENTIETHCENTURY AMERICA 5 (1992). Thus, I do not use the word “myth” to describe a story that is
known by its tellers to be false.
It is important to remember that all tribes did not engage in wars or other violent conflicts with the United States or the colonies. See, e.g., Eileen Luna-Firebaugh, ‘Att Hascu
‘Am O ‘I-oi? What Direction Should We Take?: The Desert People’s Approach to the Militarization
of the Border, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 339, 346 (2005) (stating that the Tohono O’odham
Tribe was historically, and continues to be, comprised of “peaceful farmers” who did not
undertake wars against the United States, and therefore suggesting that the term “savage
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The Article next argues that this self-defense mythology and the
oppressive history that it obscures have had important historical consequences for tribes and continue to have concrete consequences for
tribes today. These continuing consequences are largely due to the
fact that tribes today continue to be viewed as “savage” in the popular
imagination and by Supreme Court Justices. The Article further argues that such consequences can be understood as a deprivation of
the right to self-defense in a figurative sense.
More specifically, as scholars such as Robert Williams have documented, the Supreme Court implicitly relies on this racialized characterization to deny tribes their sovereign powers. Thus, despite the
fact that the federal and state governments no longer have statutes
and rules in place that deny Indians the right to carry guns, in a very
real sense Indians today lack the right to self-defense. This is because
tribes continue to be punished for their past efforts to defend themselves. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s continual abrogations of
tribal sovereign rights render tribes and the individuals, both Indian
and non-Indian, living on reservations virtually defenseless against
everything from predatory lending to violent crime. Thus, the depictions of tribes as savages are depriving tribes and Indians of their
right to self-defense in a figurative sense on a macroscopic level. Additionally, and relatedly, America’s cultural understanding of tribes as
warlike savages who perpetrated aggressions on innocent white colonists may well be working to subconsciously motivate the federal government to turn a blind eye to the horrific levels of violent crime that
plague Indian reservations in the United States.
The Article concludes that, as a nation, we must make an honest
attempt to reckon with this checkered history and that, ultimately, we
need to reevaluate both key Indian law precedents and the right to
self-defense embodied in the Second Amendment. At a minimum,
Indians’ and tribes’ constitutional rights must be protected prospectively, both in the context of self-defense as traditionally understood
and more widely. Moreover, limitations on tribal jurisdiction are, in
many cases, grounded on notions of savagery and should be regarded
as inherently suspect. Finally, as a society we must question all of our
assumptions about tribes and Indians.

tribes” in the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo should not be understood to refer to the Tohono O’odham); see also Mark D. Myers, Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the United
States, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 274 (2001) (suggesting that peaceful tribes, i.e.,
those that had not made war on the United States, were less likely to be federally recognized because they may well have been completely unknown to the U.S. government).
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A. Definitions of “Self-Defense”
The term “self-defense” has both an individual and a collective
meaning, and the jurisprudence of the Second Amendment has varied its focus between the two meanings. On an individual level, “selfdefense” refers to “[t]he use of force to protect oneself, one’s family,
4
or one’s property from a real or threatened attack.” On a collective
level, under international law the right of “self-defense” allows a nation to respond with force when an armed attack occurs, and may al5
so allow the use of force to repel an imminent attack. For tribes, collective self-defense has historically been more important, but, as
shown below, federal, state, and colonial governments have historically sought to prevent individual Indians from bearing arms, presumably to thwart the exercise of tribes’ collective right to self-defense.
In this Article, I also use the term “self-defense” more broadly, as a
constitutive role of government, and accordingly examine what aspects of sovereignty are necessary to a government’s ability to defend
its people from crime and other types of depredations.
B. The Second Amendment
By protecting the right to bear arms, the Second Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution codifies the right to self-defense on either an
individual or a collective level, or on both levels, depending on one’s
interpretation. It provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
6
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
In terms of original intent, the first portion of the Second
Amendment, from “[a] well regulated militia” through “free state,”
appears to have been designed to protect against the potential tyranny of the federal government, specifically the tyranny that would occur if the federal government were to use a standing army to oppress

4
5

6

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1481 (9th ed. 2009).
See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, When, If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force Without Prior Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 51, 58 (2001); accord BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY supra note 4, at 1481 (defining “self-defense” under international law as
“[t]he right of a state to defend itself against a real or threatened attack”); see also Thomas
M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United States After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 607, 611
(2003) (discussing the possibility that the right of “self-defense” under the U.N. Charter
has come “through practice, to include a right of action against an imminent (as opposed
to an actual) armed attack”).
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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7

unarmed state citizens. As for the second portion, relating to “the
right . . . to keep and bear Arms,” there is disagreement as to whether
this confers an individual right or only a collective right. Those who
see the Second Amendment as conferring a collective right view the
right to bear arms as pertaining solely to militia service and, there8
fore, sometimes argue that the Amendment is now defunct. By contrast, the traditional individual rights view of the Amendment was
that because the militia was comprised of all adult white male citizens
and arguably existed independently of the legislature, every person
9
has an implicit individual right to bear arms. By the mid-1990s, however, scholars had begun to construe the second clause of the
Amendment, protecting the right of the people to bear arms, as divorced in meaning from the first clause, which relates to militia ser10
vice. Therefore, such scholars concluded that there was an individual right to bear arms that was unrelated to militia service.
11
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court adopted this
latter-day individualist understanding of the Second Amendment,
thus enshrining as constitutional law the individual’s right to bear
12
arms “to defend himself and his family from criminals.” More remarkably, the Heller Court stated that military-style arms could be regulated or even prohibited consistently with the Amendment, and
therefore sanctioned restrictions on the use of arms for the militia
purposes that had previously been thought to be the core of the
13
Second Amendment.
7

8

9

10
11
12
13

See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.KENT L. REV. 103, 144, 150–51 (2000) (discussing ratifier intent and the concerns of Antifederalists and Federalists generally); H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, Muting the
Second Amendment: The Disappearance of the Constitutional Militia, in THE SECOND
AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY 148, 149 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000) (discussing the
principal drafters’ intent).
See, e.g., Ulliver & Merkel, supra note 7, at 150, 178 (concluding that “the Second
Amendment has no voice in the matter of gun regulation”); Williams, supra note 1, at
393–94 (“[T]he right to arms does belong to every individual citizen, but only if they are
united into a coherent revolutionary people. As I do not believe that Americans presently
comprise such a citizenry, I do not believe that the Amendment applies to modern conditions, by its own frame of reference.”).
See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1365, 1372–73 (1993); Don
B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82
MICH. L. REV. 204, 214 (1983); Rakove, supra note 7, at 111.
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122
HARV. L. REV. 191, 239–240 & n.250 (2008).
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
Siegel, supra note 10, at 239.
Id. at 199–200, 239; accord Maxine Burkett, Much Ado About . . . Something Else: D.C. v. Heller, the Racialized Mythology of the Second Amendment, and Gun Policy Reform, 12 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 57, 66 (2008) (“[T]he Heller majority departed from earlier precedent and
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While these differing interpretations of the Second Amendment
are not central to this Article, a working understanding of them
should aid in comprehending various scholars’ arguments. What is
essential to understand is (1) that the Second Amendment codifies
some portion of the broader right to self-defense, although there is
little agreement as to whether it is a collective or an individual right,
or both; and (2) that the right to bear arms in particular, and the
right to self-defense generally, have historically been denied to tribes
as a result of the perception of them as savage, a perception that
stems in significant part from their past acts of self-defense and which
has continuing effects on tribes today.
C. The Justices’ Perceptions of Tribes in District of Columbia v. Heller
In Heller, as noted above, a divided Supreme Court held that the
Second Amendment included an individual right to defend oneself
with a handgun and therefore struck down the District of Columbia’s
14
general ban on possession of handguns. In oral argument for the
case, Justice Kennedy interrupted counsel for the District of Columbia during his argument that the Second Amendment right was limited to the military context. The Justice then inquired whether the
Amendment had “nothing to do with the concern of the remote settler to defend himself and his family against hostile Indian tribes and
15
outlaws, wolves and bears and grizzlies and things like that.” Several
tribal advocates and Indian law scholars found Justice Kennedy’s classification of tribes with “outlaws, wolves[,] and bears” troubling, but
those outside of the Indian law field seemed to miss the racialized
implications of the question even as they extrapolated the racialized
historical underpinnings of the Amendment vis-à-vis African Ameri16
cans.

14
15
16

found, unequivocally, an individual right to bear arms for ‘traditionally lawful’ purposes,
such as self-defense within the home. Most notably, the Court found that this individual
right was unconnected to militia service. . . . The Court’s reasoning focused disproportionately on the structure of the Amendment, finding that the Amendment is ‘naturally’ divided into two parts—a prefatory clause and an operative clause. Importantly for the
Court, the prefatory clause regarding the militia does not limit or expand the operative
clause. . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290).
Compare Comments of Turtle Talk, Justice Kennedy: “Hostile Indians” May Have Been a Motivating Factor for 2nd Amendment, TURTLE TALK, http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2008/
03/19/justice-kennedy-hostile-indians-may-have-been-a-motivating-factor-for-2ndamendment/ (Mar. 19 2008, 2:21 PM) (excerpting the oral argument in which several
commenters described Justice Kennedy’s reference to “hostile Indian tribes” in this con-
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This cultural blindness regarding the racialization of American
Indians is also reflected in the Court’s opinion in Heller, when the
Court discusses the historical disarmament of African Americans and
when it quotes a speech by the nineteenth-century politician Charles
Sumner. In the Heller opinion, the majority recounts instances of
African Americans being systematically disarmed and statutory and
constitutional attempts to remedy that problem, many of which were
based on Second Amendment justifications, without mentioning In17
dians being denied the right to bear arms. More blatantly, to support its claim that anti-slavery advocates often invoked the right to
bear arms for self-defense, the Court quotes an 1856 speech by the
politician Charles Sumner in which Indians are described as one of
the chief reasons that pioneers needed arms: “The rifle has ever
been the companion of the pioneer and, under God, his tutelary pro18
tector against the red man and the beast of the forest.” This quote
not only racializes Indians by grouping them with animals, but by the
use of the term “under God,” it portrays disputes between Indians
and settlers as struggles between evil and good. Yet the loaded cha-

17

18

text as “disturbing” or “illuminating”), with Stephanie Mencimer, Whitewashing the Second
Amendment, MOTHER JONES, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/03/white
washing-second-amendment (Mar. 19 2008, 11:00 PM) (quoting Justice Kennedy’s allusion to “hostile Indian tribes” but ignoring the racialized implications of the statement
and instead deploring the Court’s failure to reckon with the Second Amendment racialized history with respect to African Americans). Classification of Indians with wolves (or
rather conflation of Indians with wolves) is a longstanding practice with roots dating back
to the Puritans. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American
Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258,
1268 (1992) (“Cotton Mather and other Puritan writers called Indians wolves, lions, sorcerers, and demons possessed by Satan.”).
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2808–11; see also Stefan B. Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 67, 79 (1991) (describing firearms prohibitions directed at Native
Americans as being used to “oppress and . . . exterminate” them, and noting that restrictions on blacks owning arms “were abolished, at least facially, during Reconstruction,”
whereas those pertaining to Indians remained in place long after). To be completely fair
to the Heller Court, it should be acknowledged that the Court was recounting the historical disarmament of African Americans in large part to support its conclusion that the
Fourteenth Amendment and other post-Second Amendment laws encompassed an individualized understanding of the right to self-defense, a conclusion that the Court saw as
bearing on the original intent of the Second Amendment. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2808–11.
The Fourteenth Amendment and the other legal provisions discussed appear not to have
been intended to protect Indian tribes or Indian individuals. See id.; see also DAVID H.
GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 163–64 (5th ed. 2005)
(addressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s inapplicability to Indians, particularly its citizenship provision). Thus, there was arguably no reason to bring them up. On the other
hand, however, the lack of historical and current concern for tribes’ and Indians’ right to
self-defense and their right to bear arms speaks volumes about America’s failure to reckon with its injustices against tribes and Indians.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2807 (internal citation omitted).
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racter of the words is not even mentioned in the majority opinion.
Similarly, Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion alludes, albeit in a
somewhat more neutral fashion than Justice Kennedy’s oral argument question or the Court’s quotation of Charles Sumner, to the
fact that “[t]wo hundred years ago, most Americans, many living on
the frontier, would likely have thought of self-defense primarily in
terms of outbreaks of fighting with Indian tribes, rebellions such as Shays’
Rebellion, marauders, and crime-related dangers to travelers on the
19
roads, on footpaths, or along waterways.” In Justice Breyer’s dissent,
Indians are one group in a list of sources of conflict that allegedly
precipitated the early Americans’ need for self-defense. They thus
are monolithically portrayed as a force to defend against and therefore implicitly lack a right to self-defense in their own right.
D. Erasure of Tribes in McDonald v. City of Chicago
Like Heller, the Court’s most recent gun rights opinion, McDonald
20
v. City of Chicago, demonstrates a cultural blindness regarding the
historical abrogation of tribal and individual Indians’ self-defense
rights. The McDonald opinion extensively reviews the history of Afri21
can American disarmament but completely ignores the similar history with respect to Native Americans. While the history of the disarmament of African Americans is clearly relevant to McDonald’s
holding that the Second Amendment had been incorporated against
the states under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
the utter lack of cognizance of Native American disarmament remains striking.
Heller’s assumption that Indian tribes were one of the paramount
reasons that colonists and early Americans needed to engage in selfdefense generally, and needed guns specifically, runs throughout the
literature on the Second Amendment and the colonial history of
22
America. This Article explores that assumption and asks what it
19

20
21
22

Id. at 2866 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). While this statement may well be
correct as to the concerns of the settlers, without further explanation or qualification, it
reflects and perpetuates a view of tribes as dangerous entities that needed to be defended
against.
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
Id. at 3038–43.
The right to self-defense also has a racially charged history with respect to African Americans, and this history has received significant scholarly attention in recent years. See, e.g.,
Burkett, supra note 13, at 86; Robert T. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second
Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 323-26 (1991);
Williams, supra note 1, at 447. While this history provides important context for the right
to self-defense, delineating how slave revolts came to be a central concern of militias in
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means for the way Indian tribes are viewed in society today and how
the assumption and the continuing racialized view of tribes it embodies affect tribal rights.
II. THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE COLONISTS’ NEED FOR SELF-DEFENSE
As discussed below, Indian attacks were the primary reason that
militias were initially formed, and throughout the colonial era, militias were understood to be necessary to protect against Indian attacks
(although, as time went on, protection against slave revolts became
23
another pressing goal of the militias). As explained below, however,
the monolithic notion of Indians as the aggressors in armed conflicts
was actually constructed subconsciously to justify the actions of colonists in perpetrating aggressions against tribes and in confiscating their
lands.
Militias were not only a central part of the colonies’ (and later the
states’ and federal government’s) mechanisms for collective selfdefense, but they are also crucial to understanding the original intent
of the Second Amendment. Because militias are a core aspect (or
24
perhaps the core) of the Second Amendment, the fact that they
were developed in large part to fight Indian tribes under the rubric
of defending against their aggressions suggests that tribes have historically been constructed as a caricatured “other” that European colonists, and then white American citizens, needed to defend against, rather than as active subjects with their own right to self-defense.

23
24

early American history and how later gun control efforts were often aimed at disarming
African Americans, this Article focuses primarily on the lesser known (and complementary) story of how the right to self-defense has operated with respect to Indian tribes.
See, e.g., Bogus, supra note 9, at 1371.
Both scholars who espouse the traditional individual rights view of the Amendment and
those who adhere to the collective rights view acknowledge the centrality of the militia.
Compare id. at 1372 (stating that “any constitutional right to bear arms is directly related
to” the militia), with Kates, supra note 9, at 213 (“[T]he individual right advocate may accept the state’s right theory and simply assert that, even though one of the
[A]mendment’s purposes may have been to protect the states’ militias, another was to
protect the individual right to arms. Indeed, the evidence suggests it was precisely by protecting the individual that the Framers intended to protect the militia.” (footnote omitted)). For a cogent argument that the constitutional right to bear arms is now defunct
because it was based on a late-eighteenth-century conception of militia service that has
since become completely archaic, see Ulliver & Merkel, supra note 7, at 148–49.
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A. The Colonial Concept of Self-Defense Related Directly to Tribes
As David Williams has explained, “Americans . . . came to love
25
guns through hating Indians.” Thus, “at [its] most macroscopic level, it is possible to understand the Second Amendment as an icon of
26
the imperial expansion of . . . European culture.”
Indeed, many
scholars agree that the militia “[o]riginally . . . was meant to protect
27
white settler communities from Native Americans.”
It should come as no surprise, then, that prior to the formation of
the Republic, British colonies, such as those in Pennsylvania, Virginia,
and Massachusetts, appear to have been predominantly concerned
with what they perceived as defending themselves against unjustified
attacks by Indians. Virginia, for instance, passed a statute in 1655–56
that outlawed the “shoot[ing] of any gunns at drinkeing (marriages
28
and ffuneralls onely excepted) [sic].” The reason for the law was
29
that “gunshots were the common alarm of Indian attack,” “of which
no certainty can be had in respect of the frequent shooting of guns in
30
drinking.” Moreover, while in the 1600s Virginia had prohibited
slaves and free blacks from carrying arms, by the 1700s the colony al25
26
27

28

29

30

Williams, supra note 1, at 469.
Id.
Burkett, supra note 13, at 86; accord Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 22, at 323–24 (“For
the settlers of British North America, an armed and universally deputized white population was necessary not only to ward off dangers from the armies of other European powers, but also to ward off attacks from the indigenous population which feared the encroachment of English settlers on their lands.”); Lucilius A. Emery, The Constitutional
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REV. 473, 474–75 (1914) (“In the American colonies, with their small revenues and beset as they were with savage and other enemies, it
was deemed necessary that every man of military age and capacity should provide himself
with arms and be ready to bear them in defense of himself and his neighbors and the colony at large.”); see also Bogus, supra note 9, at 1371 n.37 (“In 1633, for example, every
man in the Plymouth county was required to own a musket, two pounds of powder, and
ten pounds of bullets.” (citation omitted)); Nathan Kozuskanich, Defending Themselves:
The Original Understanding of the Right to Bear Arms, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1041, 1047 (2007)
(“Pennsylvanians were less concerned with an individual right to bear arms than they
were with the responsibility of the provincial government to enable them to protect
themselves on the frontier.”); Williams, supra note 1, at 469 (“Americans came to cherish
the right to arms. . . . [because they] lived in a frontier society.”).
1 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at
401–02 (1823).
Clayton
Cramer,
Gun
Control
in
the
Middle
and
Southern
Colonies,
http://www.claytoncramer.com/popular/MiddleSouthernColonialGunControl.PDF (last
visited Feb. 18, 2011); see also HENING, supra note 28, at 401 (“[T]he common enemie the
Indians, if opportunity serve, would suddenly invade this collony to a totall subversion of
the same, and whereas the only means of discovery of their plotts is by allarms [sic] . . . .”).
1 HENING, supra note 28, at 401.
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lowed limited ownership of guns by African Americans in part so that
they could “help defend frontier plantations against attacks by hostile
31
Indians.” Similarly, in 1633, the Plymouth Colony, located in what
became Massachusetts, required every man “to own a musket, two
pounds of powder, and ten pounds of bullets” to enable the colony to
32
defend itself against Indians.
Finally, in the mid- to late-1700s,
Pennsylvania experienced sharp internal conflicts as a result of popular resentment against the ruling Quaker government’s policy of “pa33
cifism and negotiation with Natives.” These conflicts, which ultimately resulted in the ousting of the pacifist Quakers from the
colonial government, led first to organization of local militias, then
later to the passage of an Assembly bill in 1763 authorizing payment
of up to 700 volunteers to protect the backcountry during harvest,
and finally to the passage of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of
1776, “which guaranteed that the people had a right to bear arms ‘for
34
the defense of themselves.’” Other colonies also formed informal
local militias to “ward off Indian attacks,” especially during the period
35
of the French and Indian War, which lasted from 1754–63.
And, most recently, the myth that Indians were a primary reason
that colonists needed to defend themselves was perpetuated in Heller
in: (1) Justice Kennedy’s oral argument question as to whether the
Second Amendment had “nothing to do with the concern of the remote settler to defend himself and his family against hostile Indian
36
tribes and outlaws, wolves and bears and grizzlies”; (2) the Court’s
37
quotation of Charles Sumner’s speech without any qualification or
explanation; and (3) Justice Breyer’s statement in dissent that “[t]wo
hundred years ago, most Americans, many living on the frontier,
would likely have thought of self-defense primarily in terms of outbreaks of fighting with Indian tribes,” as well as other sources of con31
32
33
34

35
36
37

Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 22, at 325.
Bogus, supra note 9, at 1371 n.37 (citation omitted).
Kozuskanich, supra note 27, at 1046.
Id. at 1042, 1049, 1050–51, 1061; cf. PETER SILVER, OUR SAVAGE NEIGHBORS: HOW INDIAN
WAR TRANSFORMED EARLY AMERICA 108 (2008) (describing the retreat of many Quakers
from government during this period as a “push-me-pull-you process” born in part from
their being chased out of government by their opponents largely as a result of perceived
“Quaker-Indian intimacy,” but noting that this retreat from government was also viewed
as a desirable affirmation of virtue by some Quakers).
Kozuskanich, supra note 27, at 1067.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008)
(No. 07-290).
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2807 (2008) (using the quoted passage
as evidence that the prevailing view in 1856 was that the Second Amendment protected
the right to self-defense against “the red man”).
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38

flict. Because the Second Amendment grew directly out of Americans’ colonial experiences of defending themselves through militias,
these colonial laws regarding arms-bearing and the colonies’ use of
militias to ward off perceived Indian attacks are directly relevant to
39
the Amendment.
B. The Perception of Indians as Aggressors
The monolithic perception that Indians were the aggressors was
40
necessarily colored by the colonist and early American point of view,
41
and, as explained below, it was largely inaccurate. In fact, the settlers (undoubtedly subconsciously) constructed their perception of
Indians as aggressors and savages largely to justify their own violent
42
actions against Indians. Richard Slotkin explains that “[t]he premise of the ‘savage war’ is that ineluctable political and social differences . . . make coexistence between primitive natives and civilized
43
Europeans impossible on any basis other than that of subjugation.”

38

39

40

41

42
43

Id. at 2866 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court’s most recent Second Amendment case, McDonald v. City of Chicago, does not directly reference Indian tribes. However, Justice Stevens’ mention, in dissent, of “invaders” as one of the primary concerns that
motivated the enactment of the Second Amendment may well have been meant to include Indian tribes. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3107 n.33 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Of course describing tribes as “invaders” would be ironic, although
no irony appears to have been intended.
Accord Rakove, supra note 7, at 118 (stating, in reference to the Second Amendment, “that
the ways in which Americans conceived of and formulated rights were a product not just
of what they had inherited [from British thinking] but of what they had experienced”
during the colonial era).
See, e.g., R. DAVID EDMUNDS, THE SHAWNEE PROPHET, at x (1983) (“[D]ifferent peoples
interpret the same events within their own particular cultural framework. . . . [B]oth Indians and white Americans were the products of their own cultures and had difficulty in
comprehending each others’ perspective.”); KERWIN LEE KLEIN, FRONTIERS OF
HISTORICAL IMAGINATION: NARRATING THE EUROPEAN CONQUEST OF NATIVE AMERICA,
1890–1900, at 5–6 (1997) (explaining that we evaluate stories, including historical stories,
from “within narrative traditions we can interweave with others but never entirely escape”
and that “an inquiry into historical knowledge can only be a ‘sociohistorical account of
how various people have tried to reach agreement on what to believe’”) (quoting Richard
Rorty, Solidarity or Objectivity? in RELATIVISM: INTERPRETATION AND CONFRONTATION 35–50
(Michael Krausz ed. 1989)); see also RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 28–29 (2001) (explaining that “we are all our stock of narratives–the terms, preconceptions, scripts, and understandings that we use to make sense of
the world”).
This is not to say that colonists did not genuinely fear Indians. In fact, there seems to
have been a widespread fear of Indians among white colonists in at least some areas. See,
e.g., Silver, supra note 34, at xxv, 43, 45, 47–48, 60, 129, 160 (describing such fear among
mid-Atlantic colonists in the mid- and late-1700s).
SLOTKIN, supra note 2, at 12–13.
Id. 12.
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Thus, because of the perceived “‘savage’ and bloodthirsty propensity
of the natives, such struggles inevitably become ‘wars of extermina44
tion.’” He further explains that:
In its most typical formulations, the myth of “savage war” blames Native Americans as instigators of a war of extermination. Indians were certainly aggressors in particular cases, and they often asserted the right to
exclude settlers from particular regions. But . . . [t]he accusation is better understood as an act of psychological projection that made the Indians scapegoats for the morally troubling side of American expansion:
the myth of “savage war” became a basic ideological convention of a culture that was itself increasingly devoted to the extermination or expropriation of the Indians and the kidnaping [sic] and enslavement of black
45
Africans.

Other historians have confirmed Professor Slotkin’s view. For example, Francis Paul Prucha recounts how:
In the very beginning, the natives received the English colonists hospitably, greeted them with signs of friendship, and supplied them with food.
But the image of savagism in the minds of the Europeans included a
strong element of treachery on the part of the savages, and English beha46
vior toward the Indians soon brought real enmity to the surface.

On a more general level, Richard White summarizes the extent to
which the dominant American perception of Indians, both historical
and contemporary, has varied and continues to vary from the reality
of Indian cultures and existence, thus resulting in inaccurate portrayals of tribes:
The American Republic succeeded in doing what the French and English
empires could not do. Americans invented Indians and forced Indians to
live with the consequences of this invention. . . . Europeans met the other, invented a long-lasting and significant common world, but in the end
reinvented the Indian as other. Ever since, we have seen the history of
the colonial and early republican period through that prism of other47
ness.

44
45
46
47

Id.
Id. at 12–13.
1 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE
AMERICAN INDIANS 12–13 (1984).
RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT
LAKES REGION, 1650–1815, at xv (1991) The point here is not to assign blame to either
the colonists or the Indians. It is perhaps relatively easy to understand the colonists’ desire to displace the Indians, given the rigid religious outlook many of them ascribed to
and the irrevocable investment they had made in traveling to the New World. Conversely, one can readily understand why the Indians wanted to retain their cultures, lands, and
livelihoods. But the insights possible as a result of our standpoint of over one hundred
and fifty years removal from this history can help us develop a broader, more inclusive
perspective and ultimately facilitate our engaging in more humane actions.
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Defining one’s opponents as savages in order to justify savage
treatment of them is not unique to the American colonial expe48
rience. Rather, Frédéric Mégret describes how this same motif has
played out from the inception of the international law of war in the
late 1800s until the present to exclude non-Western peoples from the
49
protective reach of the law of war by defining them as “savages.”
Thus, as Mégret argues, “international humanitarian law has always
had an ‘other’—an ‘other’ that is both a figure excluded from the
various categories of protection, and an elaborate metaphor of what
50
the laws of war do not want to be.” Accordingly, describing nonEuropeans as “savages” has allowed European countries to argue convincingly that they do not need to honor the laws of war when fighting with such peoples and, thus, that they may instigate war against
them for any reason whatsoever and that anything is permissible in
51
such wars. The justification for these exclusions was generally that
52
the so-called savages would not themselves honor the laws of war
and, thus, that inhumane measures, such as expanding bullets, could
53
Notably, some Americans used
be rightfully used against them.
America’s colonial experience with Indian tribes to justify the exclusion of purportedly savage peoples from the protections of interna48

49

50

51
52

53

One very recent example of this use of savage imputations involves accusations of war
crimes by U.S. soldiers stationed in Afghanistan. A U.S. soldier accused of masterminding three killings of Afghan civilians is said to have “had pure hatred for all Afghanis and
[to have] constantly referred to them as savages.” Gene Johnson, Hearing Begins in Alleged
Plot to Murder Afghans, COMCAST.NET NEWS, Sept. 27, 2010, http://www.comcast.net/
articles/news-national/20100927/US.Afghan.Probe/.
See generally Frédéric Mégret, From ‘Savages’ to ‘Unlawful Combatants’: A Postcolonial Look at
International Humanitarian Law’s ‘Other,’ in INTERNATIONAL LAW & ITS OTHERS 266–67
(Ann Orford, ed. 2006) (arguing that international laws of war were both inclusive and
exclusive in providing protection).
Id. at 266; accord Eliga H. Gould, Zones of Law, Zones of Violence: The Legal Geography of the
British Atlantic, circa 1772, 60 WM. & MARY Q. 471, 479, 483 (2003) (explaining that the
British Atlantic Colonies in the 1700s were perceived as being beyond the purview of international customary law and that this led to a license for violence against Indians as well
as against competing colonists).
See Mégret, supra note 49, at 269 (quoting Sven Lindqvist to demonstrate that Europeans
believed that the laws of war did not apply to “savages and barbarians”).
See id. at 289, 293–94 (discussing how “civilized nations” feared that because the “noncivilized” were unable or unwilling to adhere to the laws of war, they would gain a tactical
advantage). This concern was also voiced by colonists in reference to their conflicts with
Indians; specifically, mid-Atlantic colonists viewed the Indians’ methods of attack and
choices of victims as violating emerging international law norms regarding the laws of
war, norms about which the Indians undoubtedly knew little, if anything. SILVER, supra
note 34, at 57–60.
See Mégret, supra note 49, at 281 (quoting Lord Lansdowne, who defended his decision to
have two types of ammunition on the ground that the use of expanding bullets would be
necessary when dealing with “savages”).
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54

tional law. Taking the myth of the savage war with Indian tribes as
an earlier instance of what was to occur with the exclusionary development of the international law of war provides further evidence that
Indian tribes could not have been envisioned to have any right to selfdefense because such rights were reserved for so-called civilized nations.
III. THE HISTORY THAT AMERICA’S DOMINANT HISTORICAL NARRATIVE
OBSCURES
Although colonial America perceived the Indian populations as
making unprovoked cruel attacks on white settlers, it must be remembered that the Indians who engaged in armed conflicts with the
United States and its predecessor colonies were in many instances de55
fending their homelands from confiscation. The struggle to maintain these homelands was particularly crucial for tribes, given the pre56
valent colonialist view that Indians and settlers could not coexist and
the lack of respect that most English colonists and, later, Americans
57
showed for Indian land rights. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how
54

55

56

57

See id. at 292 (describing how one American concluded from American colonial experience that “devastation and annihilation [was] the principle method of warfare that savage tribes [knew]”).
See, e.g., PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 12 (“The [English colonists’] replacement of the Indians on the land became the basis for the enduring conflict with the Indians who remained, and Indian wars marked the English experience as they did that of the United
States.”).
See, e.g., SLOTKIN, supra note 2, at 12 (noting that the underlying premise of a “savage war”
is the view that coexistence between the natives and the civilized Europeans is impossible). This view that Indians and whites could not coexist is graphically demonstrated in
the 1881 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. See Cuthair v. Montezuma-Cortez, Colo. Sch. Dist. No. Re-1, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1158 (D. Colo. 1998)
(“‘[S]avage and civilized life’ cannot live and prosper together. One of the two must die.
If the Indians were to be a civilized people and become happy and prosperous, he [the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs] felt they should learn our language and adopt our modes and ways of life.” (quoting HIRAM PRICE, COMM’R OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (1881)).
See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) (holding that underlying fee title to Indian lands came to be vested in the European colony that first discovered the lands by virtue of the “discovery”); PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 14 (“The supremacy of the cultivator over the hunter was a classic weapon in the arsenal of the
dispossessors.”); SILVER, supra note 34, at 8 (quoting a 1741 letter from a group of Delaware Indians to Pennsylvania’s governor regarding the settlers’ encroachment on their
lands and their fear of defending their lands because of threats of violence); Gould, supra
note 46, at 499 (describing the fiction underlying the Proclamation of 1763 that the British colonies of that time were located on what had been vacant land that the indigenous
inhabitants had no want of “and of which they make no actual and constant use” (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between
the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy, and United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for
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a continent peopled by numerous nations that had inhabited it for
thousands of years could be taken over, and the nations displaced,
without the colonists experiencing violent repercussions. However,
such repercussions were nevertheless taken as evidence of the Indians’ irrepressibly violent tendencies and were used as an excuse for
58
violent retaliation.
There are countless examples of tribes’ being deprived of their
land by whites and attempting to defend themselves against the
59
losses. Below, a few colonial examples are discussed, followed by

58

59

the Next Legislative Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651, 665–67
(2009) (explaining the doctrine of discovery as formulated in Johnson v. M’Intosh); see also
SLOTKIN, supra note 2, at 40 (1973). Slotkin quotes the New York World of January 18,
1874, as follows:
[The Indians] have their choice of incorporation with the general mass of the
population and a life of civilized industry, which in the great majority of instances
they decline to lead, or else of betaking themselves to such regions as are not
needed for the maintenance of civilized men, there to remain unmolested until either the land they live on s [sic] needed, in which case they must be removed, or
else they issue from it to molest civilized settlers, in which case they must be punished with death if no less penalty will avail. The country is not yet so crowded
that the Indian must be told to work or die; but it is so crowded that he must be
told to behave himself or die.
Id. at 40–41 (quoting Our Indian Policy, N.Y. WORLD, Jan. 18, 1874, at 4).
Thus, it appears that, in 1874, one prominent view was that Indians had no right to
their land at all once it was “needed” by whites. Under this mind-set, Indians only existed
at the sufferance of the dominant white society.
On the other hand, the sharp contrast between the colonists’ Lockean views of property rights and the collective or communal understanding of those rights among Native
Americans undoubtedly led to misunderstandings on the part of the colonists as to
whether Indians claimed ownership. See, e.g., Honor Brabazon, Property Rights and Imperialism–Then and Now: Contemporary Private Property Rights Discourse in Historical Context 8–9
(May 29, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the Natives’
and colonists’ differing conceptions of property in colonial America).
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.02[1] (2009) (“When tribes rose up
in violence against what they perceived as unjustified intrusions on their land, as they did
in the Pequot War of 1637 and King Philip’s War of 1675, these attacks were taken as
cause for just wars against them, with dispossession of Indian property by conquest in reprisal.”)
A popular Indian view of the tribal role in protecting their homelands from colonial
attack is vividly demonstrated by the contemporary t-shirts that picture small groups of
armed Indians and read “Homeland Security: Fighting Terrorism Since 1492.” COYOTES
CORNER, http://www.coyotescorner.com/tshirts-hs.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). Yet
even these t-shirts have been virulently attacked by whites, presumably because they
threaten to disrupt the dominant view of colonial history. See Joseph Farah, Fighting Terrorism Since 1492, HUMAN EVENTS.COM (Oct. 4, 2006), http://www.humanevents.com/
article.php?id=17364.
While I generally use the term “white” to describe European colonists, racialized notions
of whiteness and Indianness probably did not fully develop among Americans of European descent until late in the eighteenth century. See, e.g., SILVER, supra note 34, at 114–
123 (discussing the evolution of racialized ideas of whiteness and Indianness in the midAtlantic colonies).
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some later examples. However, as the later examples illustrate, as
time wore on, Indians increasingly lacked the military force even to
60
make viable attempts at self-defense.
At the same time, it is important to remember that tribes that engaged in armed conflicts were not uniformly acting in a posture of
61
self-defense. Rather, American colonial history is an exceedingly
complex web, the complexity of which has been obscured by the monolithic view of tribes as historical aggressors that we inherited from
62
our colonial roots. In attempting to tell part of the story that has
been largely overlooked, I do not mean to imply that this is the entire
story or to replace one monolithic view of tribes with another.
A. Pre-Nineteenth-Century Examples of Tribal Acts of Self-Defense
Francis Paul Prucha explains that “as the English expanded, encroaching upon Indian lands and in many cases treating the inhabi63
tants despicably, the Indians resisted with force.” He then details
several instances of seventeenth-century conflicts that had their origin
in Indian attempts to preserve their land-bases against white encroachment. The first occurred in 1622 in Virginia, “in which the
Indians under Opechancanough rose up against white settlers who
had invaded their lands and quickly killed a quarter to one-third of
64
the population.” This revolt was then “used as an excuse for massive
retaliation against the Indians” and was “looked upon as proof that
60

61

62

63
64

See SLOTKIN, supra note 2, at 12 (stating that, with one possible exception, “after 1700, no
tribe or group of tribes pursued (or was capable of pursuing) a general ‘policy’ of exterminating or removing White settlements on a large-scale basis”).
See, e.g., id. (acknowledging that “Indians were certainly aggressors in particular cases”);
see also JOHN DEMOS, THE UNREDEEMED CAPTIVE: A FAMILY STORY FROM EARLY AMERICA 4
(1994) (alluding to instances in the colonial Northeast of Indians’ capturing colonists
and of some of these captives coming to prefer Indian ways). Additionally, European expansion into the Americas had complex effects on tribes that hinder attempts to simply
categorize even individual tribal actions as acts of aggression or defense. See, e.g., WHITE,
supra note 47, at xv (“The wars of the Iroquois proper, or the Five (later Six) Nations, [in
the mid-seventeenth century] were . . . a result of changes as complicated as I present
here. The reader should not mistake their warfare for ‘normal’ Indian warfare in North
America. It, too, was a complex product of European expansion.”)
In addition to the colonists’ and Indians’ differing conceptions of property rights, another factor that complicated land disputes between the tribes and the colonists was that, in
some cases, individual Indians would claim authority to speak on behalf of tribes and sell
tribal lands when, in fact, they lacked such authority. See, e.g., Eric Kades, The Dark Side of
Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1065, 1083 (2000) (describing examples where agreements for the purchase of land
were made by individual Indians without the approval of all members of a tribe).
PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 13.
Id.

706

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:3

65

Indians could not be trusted.” The Pequot War of 1637 was also
born from a land dispute between the Indians and the English; it resulted from English attempts to expand the Massachusetts Bay Colony
into the Connecticut River Valley and the Pequots’ resistance to those
66
attempts. King Philip’s War of 1675–1676, in which a “confederation of formerly friendly tribes” drove the New England colonies
67
“nearly to the brink of destruction,” is similarly described by Prucha
as “furnish[ing] still another case of warfare instigated by Indians in a
68
desperate attempt to stop the advancing tide of English settlement.”
However, Prucha’s description of the war’s having been instigated by
the tribes is contested. Several figures of the day, including Rhode
Island’s deputy governor, John Easton, blamed the war on Massachu69
setts’s bad faith in dealing with the Indians. Easton, in particular,
charged that a female tribal chief “‘had practised much [that] the
quarrell might be desided without war, but sum of our English allso
70
in fury against all Indians wold not consent [sic].’” Regardless of
which side actually started the war, it is clear both that a major cause
of the Indians’ discontent was white encroachment on their lands
71
and that the Puritans strove to “exterminate” their tribal opponents.
Historian R. David Edmunds recounts eighteenth-century exam72
ples involving tribes defending their lands in the Old Northwest.
For example, he describes the tribes’ attempts to maintain their hunting grounds in what is now Kentucky, along the Licking and Ken73
tucky Rivers. During the Revolutionary War, the tribes had formed
war parties to strike at white settlements along these rivers that were
interfering with their hunting practices, and Indian villages were
74
burned in retaliation. However, the tribes’ British allies promised
75
them victory after the war. Nonetheless, when the British lost the
war, they made no attempt to protect tribal property rights in the

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Id.
See id. (describing the Pequot War of 1637 as the result of English settlers’ moving into an
area inhabited by the Pequot Indians).
RICHARD SLOTKIN, REGENERATION THROUGH VIOLENCE: THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE
AMERICAN FRONTIER 1600–1860, at 79 (1973).
PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 13.
See SLOTKIN, supra note 67, at 79–81 (describing how John Easton blamed the war on the
intolerance of Massachusetts).
Id. at 80 (alteration in original).
SLOTKIN, supra note 2, at 12.
See generally EDMUNDS, supra note 40.
EDMUNDS, supra note 40, at 3.
Id.
Id.

Mar. 2011]

THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND TRIBAL SELF-DEFENSE

707

76

Treaty of Paris. The frontiersmen then began to advance further in77
to tribal territories in southern Ohio. Eventually, after “a series of
questionable treaties” and “armed expeditions,” in 1794, the Indians
78
were forced to give up their claims to most of Ohio.
Edmunds describes in detail the 1786 treaty negotiations with the
79
Shawnees relating to their claims to Ohio. Despite Britain’s assurances to the tribe that the Shawnees maintained ownership over their
lands after the Revolutionary War, armed U.S. officials told the
Shawnee treaty delegation that they would have to “give up their
claims to lands east of the Miami [River] and acknowledge the sove80
reignty of the United States over all their villages.” When a Shawnee
chief replied that the tribe had “no intention of giving up their lands
in Ohio,” the U.S. Indian agent “threatened the destruction of the
81
Shawnee women and children.”
B. Later Examples of Tribal Land Loss Often Reflect Tribes’ Inability to
Make Viable Attempts at Self-Defense
The historical record is also replete with more modern examples
of confiscation of tribal lands. However, in these later cases, tribes
generally lacked the wherewithal to defend themselves, and therefore
often did not even attempt to do so. For instance, between 1820 and
1850, the vast majority of Indian tribes that occupied lands east of the
Mississippi were rounded up by the federal government and forced to
walk west to new lands located in Oklahoma or other western regions,
82
thus giving up any remnants of their ancestral land-bases. Alexis de
Tocqueville’s description of the 1831 Choctaw removal illustrates the
brutality of the process:
It was then in the depths of winter, and that year the cold was exceptionally severe . . . . The Indians brought their families with them; there were
among them the wounded, the sick, newborn babies, and old men on the
point of death. They had neither tents nor wagons, but only some provisions and weapons. I saw them embark across the great river, and the
sight will never fade from my memory. Neither sob nor complaint rose

76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id.
Id.
Id. at 4. This turn of events resulted in demoralization among the Indians as well as
forced overcrowding as they moved into areas already occupied by other tribes. Id.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13.
ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW CASES AND COMMENTARY 75 (2008).
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from that silent assembly. Their afflictions were of long standing, and
83
they felt them to be irremediable.

Next, during the Reservation Period, from the 1820s through the
1880s, Indians were forcibly confined to reservations in the hopes of
84
converting them to white ways. Some tribal members managed to
escape from the reservations they had been confined to in order to
attempt to return to their lost homelands. But in many cases, they
were doomed because the federal government treated their refusal to
remain confined (and their attachment to their ancestral lands) as a
85
declaration of war. For example, in 1879, an imprisoned group of
Cheyennes who had escaped from their reservation and were attempting to return to their ancestral lands were told that they had to
86
return to the reservation. When they answered “‘[w]e will die, but
we will not go back,’” the federal officials attempted to force compliance by keeping the group, including women and children, in the
barracks without water for three days and without food or fuel for five
87
days in temperatures of forty degrees below zero. When the group
finally escaped, the federal troops gunned down as many of the In88
dians as they could. Twelve days later, troops found the survivors
and killed most of them as well, shooting down a total of twenty-four
89
Indians, including two babies. In this case, the Indians had made an
abortive attempt at self-defense after they had been encircled by the
troops, killing two privates and a lieutenant, before they ran out of
ammunition and were forced to desperately advance with their hunt90
ing knives.
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

90

Id. at 75.
See, e.g., id. at 77.
See, e.g., Conners v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 317, 323 (1898).
Id. at 322.
Id.
Id. at 322–23.
Id. at 323. Another example from this period of federal aggression occurred in 1864,
when the United States “slaughtered at least 150 Cheyenne and Arapaho who had gathered near Denver to make peace with the United States.” COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 1.03. In this case, however, the Tribes sought to
exercise their right to self-defense by instituting war in response: “[e]xasperated and
maddened by this cold-blooded butchery of their women and children, disarmed warriors, and old men, the remnant of these Indians sought the aid and protection of the
Comanches and Kiowas, and obtained both.” Leighton v. United States, 29 Ct. Cl. 288,
326–27 (1894).
Conners, 33 Ct. Cl. at 323. Another example of tribal land loss involves the Zuni Tribe. In
that case, the federal government took Zuni reservation lands for railroad purposes from
the late 1880s through the early 1900s, and also allowed white copper miners to appropriate Zuni aboriginal copper mines between 1877 and 1882. Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. United States, 12 Ct. Cl. 641, 657 (1987). Additionally, between 1901 and 1912, the federal
government appropriated Zuni lands for third parties under homesteading laws, “failed
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Finally, the Allotment Period, from the 1880s to the 1920s, presented another era of massive tribal land loss as a result of the federal
policy of parceling out reservations to individual tribal members
(with the intent to make it alienable fee land after a trial period) and
91
usually selling off the remainder of each reservation to whites. The
Allotment Policy was driven by white hunger for Indian lands as well
92
as by a hope to assimilate Indians into mainstream culture, and it
had the effect of reducing the total tribal land-base from 138 million
93
acres to 48 million acres.
The above examples demonstrate the extent to which tribes have
been deprived of their land throughout U.S. history. They also show
that many battles between tribes and colonists or Americans were in
some measure based on the Indians’ attempt to protect their lands
from white encroachment. Although tribes initially had the military
power to make viable attempts to maintain their lands against white
encroachment, the 1700s, 1800s, and 1900s saw tribes increasingly
less able to defend themselves or their lands. In a practical sense,
then, tribal subjugation by the U.S. government deprived tribes of
any meaningful right to self-defense by making it impossible for tribes
to act to defend themselves. Thus, it is apparent that although tribes
were perceived as aggressors, in fact they were often defending lands
that belonged to them and that had been invaded by Europeans or
confiscated by Americans.
IV. THE LABEL OF SAVAGERY WAS AN IMPORTANT AND WIDELY USED
COMPONENT OF THE PERCEPTION OF INDIANS AS THE AGGRESSORS
A. The Meaning of “Savage” as Applied to Indians
Prucha describes two basic and contradictory meanings of “sa94
vage” as applied to Indians by the colonists. The first of these is that
of the “‘noble savage’ [or] natural man living without technology and
95
elaborate societal structures.” This meaning, although inaccurate

91
92
93

94
95

to prevent Anglo, Hispanic, and Navajo trespass onto Zuni lands,” and “allowed third parties to drive the Zunis from their lands and actively prevented the Zunis from controlling
their land.” Id. at 658–59.
See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 77.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 104.
See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 77; see also Ann E. Tweedy, The Liberal Forces Driving
the Supreme Court’s Divestment and Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty, 18 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J.
147, 189–94 (2000) (discussing the Allotment Policy).
PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 7.
Id.; see also T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION,
THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 27 (2002). This appears to be the meaning that to
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and offensive for Indians, is not at issue in this Article because it does
96
not bear directly on the issue of self-defense. The second is the one
that is relevant here. It is that of the “‘ignoble savage[]’[:] treacherous, cruel, perverse, and in many ways approaching the brute beasts
with whom he shared the wilderness. In this view, incessant warfare
97
and cruelty to captives marked the Indians.” In fact, during the colonial period, “[n]ot a few Englishmen saw the Indians . . . as literally
98
children of the Devil.”
As the decades wore on, violent clashes with Indians became less
common due to tribes’ drastically decreased power, and the goal of
99
exterminating Indians gave way to one of assimilation. Thus, by the
late 1800s, rather than being seen as children of the Devil, Indians
were understood as merely biologically inferior to the Anglo-Saxons,
who were divinely destined to exert a civilizing and bettering influence not only on Indians and others present in the United States, but
100
also on non-Anglo-Saxon peoples throughout the world.
Nonetheless, the notion of Indians as warlike savages, which was
based in large part on the historical myth of the savage war, survived
and lives on even now in the collective memory and in case law defining Indians as such and using their alleged savagery to justify depriva101
tions of tribes’ sovereign rights.
Critical race theorists have explained how such racialized stereotypes function in the American

96

97
98
99

100
101

which the French colonists who inhabited the Great Lakes Region in the mid- and lateseventeenth century ascribed. WHITE, supra note 47, at 58 (describing the “common
[French colonial] misunderstanding of Algonquian society as a place of license without
order” and noting that “[i]t was this misperception that gave the word savage its power”).
However, Keith Aoki has demonstrated that such bifurcated racialized stereotypes readily
shift in popular imagination from one pole to the other, suggesting that they are in fact
closely related ways of othering members of non-white racial groups. Keith Aoki, ‘Foreignness’ & Asian-American Identities: Yellowface, World War II Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial
Stereotypes, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 15–16, 35–36, 39 (1996). Thus, it may be somewhat artificial to attempt to separate out the two stereotypes of savagery.
PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 7; see also ALEINIKOFF, supra note 95, at 27.
PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 7–8.
See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 95, at 23–28 (noting that reservation policies were eventually
defended as places where Indians “could be taught ‘arts and industry’ of European civilized life”); see also PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 9 (“[T]he white goal continued to be the ultimate transformation of the Indians with whom they came into contact, a ‘civilizing’
process that reached its apogee in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century.”).
See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 95, at 23–28.
See infra note 239; see generally infra Part V (describing how stereotypes operate in the Supreme Court’s Indian law cases). But see PRUCHA, supra note 46, at 8 (arguing that “[a]s
the English experience deepened, the theoretical concepts of noble and ignoble savagery
(though long continued in imaginative literature) were replaced by more realistic and
complex appraisals based on practical encounters”).
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102

legal system to deprive people of color of rights. In the Indian law
context, because these cases continue to be cited in contemporary
decisions that rule against tribal sovereignty, the notion of the Indian
as a dangerous warlike savage who instigated unwarranted aggressions upon innocent European settlers continues to be implicitly used
to abrogate tribes’ sovereign rights. In this sense, tribes continue to
be punished for past acts of self-defense. Moreover, abrogations of
tribal sovereignty literally render tribes unable to defend themselves
against depredations by outsiders, thus depriving them of the right to
self-defense in a practical sense.
The meaning of “savage” as warlike, hostile, or barbarous permeates early American case law and other documents. A brief sampling of these appellations, primarily from pre-twentieth century case
law, is provided below.
B. Indians Have Been Widely Defined as "Savage” in Our Early
Jurisprudence and Related Contexts
Historical descriptions of tribes (which, in some cases, continued
into the twentieth century) routinely designated Indians as “savage,”
103
“hostile,” or “barbarous.” Prior to 1900, these offensive descriptions
104
were frequently reified in both state and federal case law.
Such descriptions were based in large part on the myth that Indians were
brutal warlike aggressors, when in fact Indians who engaged in conflicts with colonies and, later, the United States were often or usually
acting to defend themselves and their homelands. These imputations
of savagery illustrate the othering of Indians based in large part upon
their acts of self-defense, and such imputations were commonly used
105
to help justify abrogating sovereign rights.
102

103

104

105

See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 96, at 20, 23–24, 32, 37–38; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 16,
at 1264; Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739, 1797
(1993).
See, e.g., Proclamation No. 28 (March 17, 1865), reprinted in 13 Stat. 753 (1866) (prohibiting sale of arms and ammunition to “hostile Indians”); see also Swetman v. Sanders, 20
S.W. 124, 125 (1892) (noting that a settler “failed to occupy the land on account of his
fear of hostile Indians”); Emery, supra note 27, at 475 (describing Indians as “savage . . . enemies”); Kozuskanich, supra note 27, at 1067 (quoting a 1757 New York Mercury
article describing Indians as “barbarous enemies”).
See, e.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT,
INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA, at xix (2005) (discussing
United States Supreme Court cases that relied on racist language in deciding “precedentsetting cases on Indian rights”).
For a description of the psychological process of othering, see, for example, Jonathan
Todres, Law, Otherness, and Human Trafficking, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 605, 611–18
(2009). As Professor Todres explains, othering occurs, especially in individualist cultures,
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1. A Sampling of “Savage” Designations in Pre-Twentieth-Century Cases
In 1801, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained that “[i]n
106
In 1814, the
1777, the [white] inhabitants fled from the savages.”
Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals of Tennessee described a rural
district as “remote from the capital, detached from the rest of Virgin107
ia by an extensive wilderness, [and] infested by an Indian enemy”
The Tennessee court further described “the harassed and endangered state of this infant settlement, whose very extermination was
108
threatened by the savage foe.”
The Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia in 1827 cited a 1711 Virginia statute that appointed Rangers
“to restrain disorderly and barbarous Indians frequenting our frontiers”
and provided that “if any Indian, of any nation at war with us, was
taken by the Rangers, he should be transported [to the West Indies],
109
and sold [as a slave] for the benefit of the Rangers.” The Supreme
Court of Alabama in 1831 quoted the preamble of an 1821 statute
enacted for one settler’s specific benefit:
“[W]hereas, the territory now composing the State of Alabama, was during our late contest with the British government, subjected to all the
hardships and cruelties, which a relentless war, waged by the merciless
savage, is calculated to produce; and whereas, our venerable citizen, Colonel Samuel Dale, was the first to . . . save its defenceless [sic] inhabi110
tants from Indian rapine, and Indian barbarity . . . .”

In an 1835 Tennessee Supreme Court case, the court affirmed its
jurisdiction over a murder involving a Cherokee victim and a Cherokee accused that took place within Cherokee territory, despite con111
trary Supreme Court precedent.
The majority opinion discussed
the white settlement of the Carolinas, concluding that:
[T]he principle by which the country was taken possession of, was the only rule of action possible to be observed . . . it was more just the country
should be peopled by Europeans, than continue the haunts of savage
beasts, and of men yet more fierce and savage, who, “if they might not be

106
107
108
109
110
111

at both the individual and collective levels, and “[a]t both . . . level[s], this Self/Other dichotomy functions to create (1) a devalued and dehumanized Other, enabling differential treatment of the Other; (2) a conception of a virtuous Self and corresponding assumption that the Self (or dominant group) is representative of the norm; and (3) a
distancing of the Other from the Self.” Id. at 613–14.
Lessee of Clark v. Hackethorn, 3 Yeates 269, 270 (Pa. 1801).
Smith v. Lessee of Craig, 2 Tenn. 287, 1814 WL 314, at *8 (Tenn. Err. & App. 1814).
Id.
Gregory v. Baugh, 25 Va. 611, 633–34 (1827) (emphasis added).
Dale v. Governor, 3 Stew. 387, 388 (Ala. 1831).
State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256, 337 (1835). The U.S. Supreme Court had held three
years earlier in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 596 (1832), that the State of
Georgia lacked jurisdiction over Cherokee territory within its state boundaries.

Mar. 2011]

THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND TRIBAL SELF-DEFENSE

713

extirpated for their want of religion and just morals, they might be reclaimed for their errors” . . . . [a] rule of which savages of this description
112
have no just right to complain.

The court went on to describe the tribes of the “immense west and
northwest” as “[t]ribes that subsist on raw flesh, and are savage as the
113
most savage beasts that infest that mighty wilderness.” In somewhat
less inflammatory, but still racially charged, language, the Court of
Appeals of Law of South Carolina referred, in 1847, to “frequent wars
with the savage tribes” and then stated that “[t]he Indians were reck114
less of their own life, and greedy of that of their enemy.”
In 1859, the U.S. Supreme Court cited the petition of two settlers
115
to establish a ranch in what later became California. The 1838 petition stated that the desired “tract is uncultivated, and in the power of
a multitude of savage Indians, who have committed and are daily
committing many depredations; and being satisfied that the tract does not
belong to any corporation or individuals, they earnestly ask the grant, of116
fering to domesticate the Indians.”
117
In The Sutter Case of 1864, the Court described the land Sutter
attempted to settle beginning in 1839 as “uninhabited, except by
bands of warlike Indians, who made frequent predatory incursions
upon the undefended settlements to the south and east of this
118
place.”
In 1865, the Court of Claims described the Territory of New Mexico during the period between January and August of 1855, stating
that “[t]here were repeated acts of depredation by the Indians upon
the property of the white settlers, many acts of cruelty, murder, and
119
massacre, such as are incident to savage warfare.” An 1866 federal
appellate case from Oregon referred with reverence to “those who
had settled and held the country for the United States, amid extreme
120
privation and suffering, against the dangerous and savage Indian,”
while a Court of Claims case in the same year described the Indian
population of the upper San Joaquin Valley as “most numerous, most
121
warlike, and most hostile.”
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Foreman, 16 Tenn. at 265.
Id. at 278.
State v. Belmont, 35 S.C.L. (4 Strob.) 445, 451 (S.C. App. L. 1847).
United States v. Teschmaker, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 392, 401 (1859).
Id. (emphasis added). Note the troubling view that the Indians’ occupation of the tract
did not demonstrate that they had any ownership interest.
The Sutter Case, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 562, 587 (1864).
Id. at 563.
Alire v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 233, 238 (1865).
Chapman v. School District, 5 F. Cas. 487, 491 (C.C.D. Or. 1866).
Fremont v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 461, 464 (1866).
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In 1874, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Idaho described
“[t]he whole country” as having been “inhabited by wild and barbar122
ous savages.” In 1877, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that upon
Wisconsin’s admission to the Union in 1846, “Congress undoubtedly
expected that at no distant day the State would be settled by white
people, and the semi-barbarous condition of the Indian tribes would
123
give place to the higher civilization of our race.”
Finally, in 1883,
the Supreme Court of Nevada noted that “[i]n 1861 the Indians here
were savages in name and fact,” and that, although “[s]ome were
peaceable [and] others aggressive and warlike,” they “killed inoffen124
sive white men.”
The caricatured history depicted in these cases contrasts sharply
with the historians’ accounts discussed above in that this case law
monolithically portrays the tribes, many of whom were presumably
fighting to retain their lands, as savage aggressors. While these comprise a mere sampling of those pre-1900 cases that describe Indians as
savages or use other designations of the same import, they provide a
general idea of the extent to which Indians were viewed through the
125
prism of violent, irrational otherness and even demonized.
Given
that Indians were being described as such in significant part as a result of their attempts to defend themselves and their homelands and
their resistance to European encroachment, this judicial othering of

122
123
124
125

Pickett v. United States, 1 Idaho 523, 530 (1874).
Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 526 (1877).
State ex rel. Truman v. McKenney, 2 Nev. 171, 179 (1883).
It is important to understand that this view of tribes, although extremely prevalent, was
probably not universal. For example, in 1826, the Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals
of Tennessee surprisingly concluded that:
[T]he early notions of the Spaniards and others, “that the Indians were mere savage
beasts without rights of any kind,” have long since been exploded, as the result of avarice, fraud, and rapacity; and that those who acted upon them, are at this day
deemed by the people of the United States, more savage and cruel than those they
despoiled. The Cherokees are, in point of fact, a conquered people, with acknowledged rights; which rights, I am proud to say, have for the last thirty years,
been respected with that good faith on our part, that became us as honest men
and christians, and which the courts of justice are bound to regard.
Cornet v. Winton’s Lessee, 10 Tenn. 143, 150 (1826) (citation omitted). Given that the
author of this opinion was Judge Catron, the same judge who wrote the opinion in Foreman, which was decided a few years later, and that he later became a Supreme Court Justice and authored a concurring opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1856), in which he argued that Dred Scott was lawful property the title to which Congress could not annul, this language should not be over-emphasized. See Dred Scott, 60
U.S. (19 How.) at 527–29 (Catron, J., concurring); see supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text (quoting and citing Foreman). It is difficult to know what to make of the discrepancies among the language used here, that used in Foreman, and that used in Justice Catron’s opinion in Dred Scott.
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Indians as savage and the concomitant abrogations of tribal rights to
be discussed later serve to punish tribes for past acts of self-defense.
2. Contemporary References to Indians as Savages
Judicial references to Indians as savages have become less common, although they still occur in published opinions, usually in quotations of earlier cases or documents. Three recent examples are discussed below. In April 2009, a federal bankruptcy court in Texas
quoted language from an 1857 Texas Supreme Court case, which the
bankruptcy court appreciatively described as “colorful[]”:
It has been comparatively but a few years since the first settlements of
Americans were made in Texas. The whole country was then infested by
savages. Subsequently there were hostilities with Mexicans, and the frontiers are still exposed to the incursions of Indians. The country has been
126
settled, and still is settling, by, in a great measure, force of arms.

In Warren v. United States, decided in 2000, the District of Columbia
Circuit held plaintiff’s quiet title action to be barred by the statute of
127
limitations. In so holding, the court quoted a 1947 Supreme Court
case that distinguished the quiet title action at issue there from those
128
involving “‘savage tribe[s]’” and “‘hitherto unknown islet[s].’”
Finally, in 1987, the Court of Claims noted that in the 1500s, the Spanish had recognized the Zuni Tribe’s territory “as a foreign nation and
129
not as an area occupied by a savage tribe.”
These references, with the exception of the first from In re Wilson,
are generally less virulent than the earlier references to tribes as savages. However, they nonetheless demonstrate that it is still acceptable and even legally sanctioned to refer to tribes as “savages,” at least
130
by quoting earlier cases and other documents.
These cases also
demonstrate that when modern courts quote earlier sources that use
this type of language, the language is not considered so abhorrent
that modern courts feel the need to explicitly disclaim it or to careful131
ly examine the rationale of the cases cited for elements of racism.

126
127
128
129
130

131

In re Wilkinson, 402 B.R. 756, 765 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (quoting Choate v. Redding, 18 Tex.
579, 580–81 (1857)).
Warren v. United States, 234 F.3d 1331, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1338 (quoting United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256, 268 (1947)).
Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 607, 618 (1987).
See WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 57 (explaining that modern Indian law cases rely on earlier explicitly racist cases “frequently and without any form of discomfort, embarrassment,
or even qualification”).
This blindness is most likely due to the basic cultural problem “that much hate speech is
not perceived as such at the time” because it accords with “messages, scripts, and stereotypes
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Thus, referring to tribes and Indians as “savages” appears to remain
at least somewhat socially acceptable, even in the staid arena of the
judiciary. This situation for tribes and Indians, in which racial epithets are still used in judicial opinions without being recognized as
such, differs markedly from that for African Americans in that courts
tend to not only not rely on virulently racist decisions pertaining to
132
133
them, such as Dred Scott, but also explicitly disclaim such decisions.
Furthermore, unlike the situation for tribes and Indians, racial epithets used to demean African Americans tend to be recognized as
134
such and thus may be avoided by courts, even in quotations.
By
contrast, courts’ continued repetition of language denigrating tribes
as “savage,” without any express disapproval of the earlier language,
signals to the rest of society that it is both legal and reasonable “to act
in a racially discriminatory and hostile way” towards tribes and In135
dians.
Additionally, as argued below, such repetition and reliance
136
on offensive opinions enable further derogation of tribal rights.
Moreover, because the language of savagery is tied to and stems in
significant part from many tribes’ defense of their homelands (in
other words, from their exercise of the right of self-defense) the repetition of the language and the abrogations of tribal sovereignty that
are based on it constitute a punishment for tribes’ historical exercise
of their right to self-defense. Furthermore, tribes’ sharply circum-

132
133
134

135
136

that are embedded . . . in the national psyche.” DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 40, at
28.
60 U.S. 393 (1856).
See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 18 (“Supreme Court justices [sic] never cite [Dred
Scott] . . . except as a prime example of a very bad precedent.”).
See, e.g., Jones v. First Student, Inc., No. 07-C-7139, 2009 WL 2949720, at *3 & n.3 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 9, 2009) (noting, in an employment discrimination case, that the word “nigger,”
which was alleged to have been used by the plaintiffs’ co-worker, would be replaced
throughout the opinion by “N-word”); see also EEOC v. Bimbo Bakeries U.S.A., Inc., No.
1:09-CV-1872, 2010 WL 598641, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2010) (“While simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents usually do not amount to discriminatory changes
in the terms and conditions of employment, the use of racial epithets—especially the
word ‘nigger,’ which has a long and sordid history in this country—can quickly change
the atmosphere, environment, and culture of a workplace from positive to poisonous.”);
Jones, 2009 WL 2949720, at *5 (quoting another court’s statement that the “N-word is an
‘unambiguously racial epithet’”) (internal citation omitted).
WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 21.
Cf. Ruben J. Garcia, Labor as Property: Guestworkers, International Trade, and the Democracy
Deficit, 10 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 27, 41 (2006) (discussing the fact that popular portrayal
of undocumented immigrants as “animals” makes it “easier for Americans to see both legal and illegal immigrants as lacking any rights” and arguing that “framing guestworkers
as goods to be imported” similarly “leads to a conception of guestworkers as lacking any
agency in the terms and conditions of their employment”).
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scribed sovereignty under federal law literally renders them unable to
defend against non-Indian depredations.
3. Five Supreme Court Cases That Use the “Savagery” Designation Form
Part of the Canon of Indian Law and Continue to Be Widely Cited
In addition to the overt contemporary use of the term “savage”
discussed above, four Supreme Court cases from the 1800s and one
from the 1950s that use designations of ignoble savagery form part of
the canon of Indian law and continue to be cited by the Supreme
137
Court and other courts. While the continuing effect of these cases
will be addressed in detail in Part V, it is useful here to understand
the racist language that the Court used in these cases.
In the earliest case, Johnson v. M’Intosh, Chief Justice Marshall
stated that:
[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose
occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the
forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the
country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people, was impossible,
because they were as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and
138
were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their independence.

While this description is less one-dimensionally racialized than many
of the others cited above, it still contains extremely harmful racialized
elements. For one, “the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country” are
defined monolithically, despite the fact that tribes are in fact culturally diverse. More importantly for the purposes of this Article, they are
all classed “as fierce savages whose occupation was war.” Finally, the
Court states that “[t]o leave them in possession of their country was
to leave the country a wilderness.” While the statement contains an
implicit and somewhat rare acknowledgement that the country did in
fact belong to tribes, it is followed by the all-too-familiar claim that
the Indians somehow did not deserve to retain their lands, apparently
because of their differing conception of property rights. Coupled
with the description of Indians as “fierce savages, whose occupation
was war,” this statement supports Justice Marshall’s conclusions that
the colonial government’s attempt to dispossess and conquer them
was inevitable and that the United States had a legal right to their
137

138

See generally Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); Ex Parte Crow Dog,
109 U.S. 556 (1883); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S.(8 Wheat.) 543 (1823);
see also WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 51–58, 60–70, 75–79, 89–95 (discussing these five cases and their use of the language of savagery).
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 590.
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139

land under the doctrine of discovery. Thus, this passage operates as
a justification for the course of colonial and early American history,
much along the lines of Richard Slotkin’s discussion of the myth of
140
the savage war.
In Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in the next case, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, he rejects the argument that the Cherokee Nation can
be considered a foreign nation under the Constitution for purposes
of invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction in a suit against Georgia,
which was then committing numerous depredations against the Na141
tion and its people. Part of the Chief Justice’s reasoning for rejecting the Cherokee’s argument is that “the habits and usages of the Indians” at the time the Constitution was written did not lend
themselves to the institution of legal actions; rather, “[t]heir appeal
142
was to the tomahawk, or to the government.”
So, once again, we
see the Court espouse a view of a tribe as irrational and warlike, and
once again, this view is used to justify denying the tribe the legal
rights to which others (here, other nations) are considered automatically entitled. Moreover, the Court’s decision literally had the effect
of leaving the Nation defenseless against Georgia’s attempts “to annihilate the Cherokees as a political society, and to seize, for the use of
Georgia, the lands of the nation which have been assured to them by
the United States in solemn treaties repeatedly made and still in
143
force.”
139

140
141

142
143

The doctrine of discovery granted European nations rights to tribally occupied land in
the New World by virtue of “discovering” it. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 51–53
(alteration in original); see also Tweedy, supra note 57, at 665–67 (2009) (explaining the
doctrine of discovery as formulated in Johnson v. M’Intosh). In addition to the deprivation
of tribal property rights that it effected, the doctrine of discovery also justified infringement on other aspects of tribal sovereignty. See, e.g., Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 6 (2005) (explaining that Indian “national sovereignty and independence were considered to have been limited by Discovery
since it restricted the Indian nations’ international diplomacy, commercial, and political
activities to only their ‘discovering’ European country”).
See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text (discussing and quoting from SLOTKIN, supra note 2).
See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 7–8, 12–13, 15, 20 (“[A]n Indian tribe or nation
within the United States is not a foreign state in the sense of the constitution, and cannot
maintain an action in the courts of the United States.”); see also Gloria Valencia-Weber,
The Supreme Court’s Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from Constitutional Principles and the
Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 454 (2003) (detailing violent
actions undertaken by the citizens of Georgia against Indians in the late 1700s).
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18.
Id. at 15. In a 2009 petition for certiorari, a tribal member asked the Court to overturn
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia’s determination that tribes are not foreign nations on the basis
that it was unconstitutional and in violation of the United States’ human rights treaty obligations, and he further suggested that the decision was comparable to Plessy v. Ferguson,
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Next, in Worcester v. Georgia, a case that actually affirms tribal sovereignty vis-à-vis the claims of the State of Georgia, the Court makes
144
For instance, it demultiple references to the tribes as warlike.
scribes the tribes’ “general employment” as “war, hunting, and fish145
ing.”
Later, the Court describes tribes as “[f]ierce and warlike in
146
Finally, and perhaps most offensively, the Court
their character.”
quotes from, and relies upon, virulently anti-Indian colonial charters
in reaching its decision that the State of Georgia lacks the authority
to unilaterally declare war on the Cherokees under the circumstances
147
of the case. For example, it quotes the following language from the
charter to William Penn: “in so remote a country, near so many barbarous nations, the incursions, as well of the savages themselves, as of
148
other enemies . . . may probably be feared.” It similarly quotes the
charter to Georgia as follows:
[W]hereas our provinces in North America have been frequently ravaged
by Indian enemies, more especially that of South Carolina, which, in the
late war by the neighbouring savages, was laid waste by fire and sword,
and great numbers of the English inhabitants miserably massacred; and
our loving subjects, who now inhabit there . . . will, in case of any new
war, be exposed to the like calamities, inasmuch as their whole southern
149
frontier continueth unsettled, and lieth open to the said savages.

The references to the warring character of the tribes give credence to
a racialized, caricatured view of them as irrational instigators of war.
This view is amplified by the damning anti-Indian judgments contained in the colonial charters. While the charters undoubtedly constituted good evidence of the reach of Georgia’s and other states’
powers over tribes under English law, to quote them without even acknowledging the one-sided views they encompassed perpetuated the

144
145
146
147
148
149

163 U.S. 537, 552–53 (1896), upholding the “separate but equal” doctrine of racial segregation. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–11, Smith v. Shulman, No. 09-512 (Oct. 28,
2009), available at http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2009/11/01/shinnecock-memberasks-supreme-court-to-overturn-cherokee-nation-v-georgia/, cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 809
(2009). In the extremely unlikely event the Court were to decide to overrule Cherokee Nation on this issue at some point, the overruling would presumably have the effect of reestablishing tribes’ collective right to self-defense as nations under international law. See
supra Part I.A, (describing the collective right to self-defense under international law).
But given the complicated and enmeshed relationship between federally recognized tribes and the federal government that has developed since Cherokee Nation, it is now very
difficult to imagine the Court holding tribes to be foreign nations.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
Id. at 543; WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 64 (citing Worcester and discussing quoted language).
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 546.
WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 67–68.
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 545.
Id. at 546.
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stereotypes of Indians and the view that they in fact committed the
atrocities of which they are accused.
150
In it,
The fourth case, Ex Parte Crow Dog, was decided in 1883.
the Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over an onreservation murder of one Indian by another that had already been
resolved according to tribal tradition because Congress had not expressly provided for federal jurisdiction. While this case is considered
by many to be a victory for tribal rights, albeit a short-lived one, it is a
victory that relies on a racalized premise and, in that sense, it is a very
151
dangerous victory. The Court explains that the Sioux, pursuant to a
treaty and associated act of Congress:
[W]ere . . . to be subject to the laws of the United States, not in the sense
of citizens, but, as they had always been, as wards subject to a guardian;
not as individuals, constituted members of the political community of the
United States, with a voice in the selection of representatives and the
framing of the laws, but as a dependent community who were in a state of
pupilage, advancing from the condition of a savage tribe to that of a
people who, through the discipline of labor, and by education, it was
152
hoped might become a self-supporting and self-governed society.

Thus, in addition to relying on racialized ward-guardianship language
and describing tribes as in a “state of pupilage”—ideas that both de153
rive from the Marshall Trilogy —the Court uses the Sioux’s alleged
savagism to justify their lack of political rights.
Later in the opinion, the Court goes even further:
It is a case where . . . that law . . . is sought to be extended over aliens and
strangers; over the members of a community, separated by race, by tradition, by the instincts of a free though savage life, from the authority and
power which seeks to impose upon them the restraints of an external and
unknown code, and to subject them to the responsibilities of civil conduct, according to rules and penalties of which they could have no previous warning; which judges them by a standard made by others, and not
for them, which takes no account of the conditions which should except
them from its exactions, and makes no allowance for their inability to
understand it. It tries them not by their peers, nor by the customs of
their people, nor the law of their land, but by superiors of a different
race, according to the law of a social state of which they have an imperfect conception, and which is opposed to the traditions of their history, to the
habits of their lives, to the strongest prejudices of their savage nature; one which
154
measures the red man’s revenge by the maxims of the white man’s morality.

150
151
152
153
154

Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 77–79.
109 U.S. at 568–69.
WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 76–77; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
1, 17 (1831).
109 U.S. at 571 (emphasis added).
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Here again, the quote is saturated with racialized constructs. The
reference to the Sioux’s “free though savage life” suggests that they
are lawless and therefore inferior when in fact their laws were simply
155
different than those of the dominant colonial society. It describes
the law under which the Sioux defendant was charged as “opposed to
the strongest prejudices of [the Sioux’s] savage nature,” again suggesting that the rule of law itself is foreign to the tribe’s irrational savagism. Finally, the passage makes a binary distinction between “the
red man’s revenge,” again incorporating the idea of Indians as irrational and vengeful, with the rational and civilized “maxims of the
156
white man’s morality.” The references to the “strongest prejudices”
of the Sioux’s “savage nature” and to the “red man’s revenge” are
ironic, however, because there was nothing vengeful or savage about
the traditional resolution of the murder that the tribe had already effected; rather, in an effort to “preserve the community cooperation
necessary for the Sioux way of life,” peacekeepers were ordered to
meet with both sides, after which the murderer’s family made an of157
fering to the victim’s family of money, horses, and a blanket. Thus,
the real problem from the perspective of the federal government appears to have been that the tribal solution was not savage enough.
The final Supreme Court case that explicitly incorporates language of ignoble savagery and continues to be widely cited is the 1955
158
case, Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States.
This case builds on the
doctrine of discovery, as formulated in Johnson, to hold that tribes are
not entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment when
lands to which they have aboriginal title are confiscated by the United
159
States government.
The Court uses the language of savagery to
help bolster its conclusion that the Tee-Hit-Ton Tribe was not entitled to Fifth Amendment compensation due to the fact that tribes
generally have lost their lands to the United States through conquest
rather than through arms-length transactions:

155

156
157

158
159

See, e.g., Rebecca Tsosie, Cultural Challenges to Biotechnology: Native American Genetic Resources and the Concept of Cultural Harm, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 396, 397–98 (2007) (describing traditional tribal notions of property rights).
109 U.S. at 571; see WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 78–79 (describing this passage from Ex
Parte Crow Dog).
ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 91; see also Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and
the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709, 770 & n.303 (2006) (alluding to the traditional tribal resolution that had already taken place in Ex Parte Crow Dog).
348 U.S. 272 (1955).
WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 89–94 (discussing the holding and background of Tee-HitTon Indians and connecting it with the Johnson case).
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Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent
were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the
Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and
trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors’ will that deprived them of
160
their land.

Here we see the adjective “savage” working to implicitly dehumanize
the tribes and lessen or obliterate any possible sympathy that the
reader might feel for them as a result of the uncompensated confisca161
tion of their land. In effect, we as non-Indian readers are told that
the tribes are just savages, so we need not worry about what happens
to them.
As discussed below, this racialized imagery of Indians has had and
continues to have devastating effects for tribes in terms of their legal
162
rights and the violence they face and have faced with impunity.
Robert Williams has explained that in incorporating racist constructs
such as savagery into landmark decisions, the Supreme Court “gives
racism an authoritative, binding legal meaning in our legal system”
and that “[t]he perceived inferiority of that group has been given the
163
sanction of law in the legal history of racism in America.” I would
argue that, although the Supreme Court may be the most important
vessel of this power, all American courts possess it to some degree.
Thus, based on the numerous cases quoted above, it is clear that racialized views of Indians, particularly those caricaturing them as violent, irrational, and warlike (i.e., ignoble savages) are an important
164
constituent of American history and continue in force today. As
shown below, these caricatured images have facilitated both vigilante

160

161

162

163
164

Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 289–90. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians to some degree bucks the
trend of describing tribes as aggressors in that it seems to admit that the United States
and the colonies instigated conflicts in attempts to confiscate tribal lands.
Cf. Garcia, supra note 136, at 41 (explaining how descriptions of groups such as immigrants and guestworkers as inhuman can lead to a popular conception that such groups
lack rights); accord Johnson, supra note 102, at 1747 (describing how the racialized testimony of a white witness to the effect that the black victim was bear-like and “subhuman”
in the trial of police officers for the beating of Rodney King allowed the jurors to disregard the victim’s suffering and the wrongs inflicted upon him).
See WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at xxv (“The racist precedents and language of Indian savagery . . . have most often worked . . . to justify the denial to Indians of important rights of
property, self-government, and cultural survival.”).
Id. at 17.
E.g., id. at 39 (“Indianophobia, as generated by the language of Indian savagery in American history, is an important part of who we are as a people in America. It’s one of the
original, founding forms of racism and racial hostility cultivated by Europeans in the New
World, and it constitutes a primal driving force in defining how we became who we are as
a people today.”).
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165

and state-sanctioned violence against Indians. The images also motivated the federal, state, and colonial governments to explicitly deny
Indians the right to self-defense, including the narrower right to bear
arms. Additionally, as discussed in Part V.A, these images are used to
implicitly justify abrogations of tribal sovereignty in case law.
D. Unpunished Acts of Vigilantism Against Indians and Legally Sanctioned
Violence Against Them
Historical vigilante and state-sanctioned violence against Indians is
discussed below, followed by the denial of Indians’ rights to selfdefense, including the right to bear arms. Both patterns—that of violence against Indians and that of explicitly denying Indians the right
to self-defense—are necessarily tied to the American view of Indians
as violent savages who need to be preemptively attacked and dis166
armed to protect white safety.
1. Vigilante Violence at Work: The Paxton Riots of 1763 and 1764
As might be expected, the stereotypes and the perceived otherness of Indians that they embody enabled the colonists and early
Americans to engage in brutal, unpunished acts of violence against
individual Indians and tribes. Indeed, such vigilante attacks were
167
common in early American history. One particularly important in165

166
167

Accord Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 16, at 1264 (noting that the stereotype during the
Reconstruction Period of African American men as “brutish and bestial . . . was offered to
justify the widespread lynching that took 2,500 black lives between 1885 and 1900”).
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., EDMUNDS, supra note 40, at 4–5 (“Although white poachers [in the 1790s] killed
deer on Indian lands with impunity, tribesmen trespassing on white property were considered fair game for frontier marksmen. Many Indians on peaceful trading ventures within the settlements were robbed and murdered by American citizens, but frontier courts
systematically acquitted culprits accused of such crimes. . . . Governor William Henry
Harrison of Indiana Territory confessed that ‘a great many of the Inhabitants of the Fronteers [sic] consider the murdering of Indians in the highest degree meritorious.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)); id. at 22 (“[In 1800,] Governor St. Clair pointed out
that the Shawnees and their Indian neighbors daily were subjected to ‘injustice and
wrongs of the most provoking character, for which I have never heard that any person
was ever brought to justice and punishment . . . .’”); see also Valencia-Weber, supra note
141, at 454 (quoting President Washington’s 1795 statement that “‘the fair prospect [of
amicable relations with the Cherokees and Creeks as a result of successful treaty negotiations] in this quarter has been once more clouded by wanton murders, which some citizens of Georgia are represented to have recently perpetrated on hunting parties of the
Creeks, which have again subjected that frontier to disquietude and danger’”). See generally Keith Thor Carlson, The Lynching of Louie Sam, 109 B.C. STUD. 63, 63 (1996) (describing the unpunished lynching of a fifteen-year-old Indian boy from British Columbia in
1884 by Washington settlers who framed him for murder, and noting that “[w]ithin
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stance of such vigilante violence was the Paxton Riots, which are credited with having significantly shaped the individual rights concep168
In Pennsyltion of the Second Amendment that Heller embodies.
vania in December 1763, “a group of mostly Scot[s]-Irish Presbyterian
frontiersmen slaughtered twenty Indians . . . claiming that [they] had
169
perpetrated murders along the frontier.” In early 1764, these same
frontiersmen marched to Philadelphia “intent on killing the Mora170
vian Indians moved there by the government for protection.” In an
effort to gain more public support for their actions, the rioters later
171
voluntarily issued what apparently passed for an apology.
It included six sworn testimonies of “dubious veracity” asserting that the
slaughtered Indians had been guilty of murder and asked the rhetorical question of whether “‘any person [can] be so little acquainted
with the law of nature, . . . as to suppose that the [Indians’] giving up
this single article [of their independent nationhood] to us would se172
cure to every individual of them the benefit of a trial by our laws.’”
This rhetorical question indicates the disdain in which at least some
settlers held Indians, and it shows that some such people believed
that Indians were fair game for murder with impunity.
Despite the protestations of the Quakers, “no trial was ever held,”
173
and these men were never brought to justice. Instead, their actions
are credited with having helped “shape[] popular ideas of defense
174
and the essential role government played in providing safety.”

168

169
170
171
172
173
174

American society, vigilante violence had long been viewed as a legitimate means of establishing (or re-establishing) social order”). Recently, the Washington State Legislature
passed a resolution acknowledging the lynching and apologizing for not taking action
against the lynchers. H.R. Res. 4715, 2006 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006), available at
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2005-06/Pdf/Bills/House%20Resolutions/
4715-Sto%20lo%20Nation.pdf; S. Res. 8729, 2006 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006), available at
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/200506/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Resolutions/8729-Sto-lo%20Nation.pdf; see also Richard Slotkin,
Equalizers: The Cult of the Colt in American Culture, in GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 54, 62 (Bernard E. Harcourt ed., 2003) (stating that “[v]igilantism is the extralegal use of deadly force by an organization of private individuals to achieve some public
or political goal” and that “[v]igilante or ‘Regulator’ movements figured periodically in
the development of frontier settlements before 1850, . . . [b]ut after 1865, vigilance organizations became the cutting edge of social conflict”).
See Kozuskanich, supra note 27, at 1042, 1044, 1052–53 (describing how the historical origins of the Second Amendment were impacted by the legal complaints that motivated the
Paxton Riots).
Id. at 1051.
Id.
Id. at 1052.
Id.
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1054.
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This instance of vigilantism and the rioters’ success in influencing
their fellow colonists and the colonial government, which eventually
adopted the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of 1776 partly in re175
sponse to the Paxton Riots, are particularly significant for purposes
of understanding the vision of the Second Amendment espoused by
the Supreme Court in Heller. This is because “[i]ndividual rights
scholars have consistently claimed the Pennsylvania Declaration of
Rights as their own, insisting that it provides evidence that Americans
176
understood the right to bear arms as one of personal self-defense.”
Moreover, “the language of Pennsylvania’s Declaration of Rights of
1776” is “[a]t the center” of the D.C. Circuit’s “historical interpretation of the Second Amendment” that the Supreme Court affirmed in
177
Heller.
More importantly, the Heller majority itself significantly relied on the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights in construing the
178
Second Amendment to include an individual right to bear arms.
This history shows that the Second Amendment as presently constituted stems from an idea of Indians as savage enemies who lacked
rights of their own and against whom colonists needed to defend. In
other words, the amendment is historically predicated on destructive,
racialized views of Indians.
2. Legally Sanctioned Violence Against Indians
In addition to vigilantism, there were also many instances of de
jure violence against Indians, which were implicitly justified by the
notion of tribes as savages. One particularly stark example is the fact
that many colonies had laws providing for the payment of bounty for
179
delivery of Indian scalps.
Additionally, the State of Georgia hanged a Cherokee man in
1830 in open defiance of a writ of error from the U.S. Supreme
180
Court.
Prior to the hanging, a conference of Georgia judges had
175
176
177
178
179

180

Id. at 1060–62.
Id. at 1044.
Id. at 1041–42 (discussing Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007),
aff’d District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008)).
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2802 (2008).
See, e.g., David D. Haddock & Robert J. Miller, Can a Sovereign Protect Investors from Itself?
Tribal Institutions to Spur Reservation Investment, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 173, 182
n.43 (2004) (noting that “most colonies paid bounties for Indian scalps, which often just
led to the murder of Christianized, neutral, peaceful Indians”); see also Proclamation of
Jonathan Belcher, Governor of the Province of New Jersey (June 2, 1756) (providing for
payment of $130 for delivery of an adult male Indian scalp).
ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 53–54; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,
12–13 (1831).
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rejected the Cherokee Nation’s legal argument that the State lacked
jurisdiction because the crime occurred in federally recognized Cherokee territory, concluding that the “‘habits, manners, and imbecile
intellect’ of the Indians opposed their governance as an independent
181
state.” When the Supreme Court finally determined in a later case,
182
Worcester v. Georgia, that the State of Georgia lacked jurisdiction over
Cherokee territory, the Georgia Guard retaliated against the celebrating Cherokees by throwing three of them in jail and promising that if
the United States attempted to come to their aid, the Cherokees
183
“would be swept of the Earth before any assistance could arrive.”
Moreover, colonies such as Virginia had laws that prescribed brutal punishments for Indians and African Americans. For instance, a
1723 Virginia law provided that “Negros, Mullattos, or Indians,” could
testify against “Negros, or other slaves” accused of conspiring to rebel
or make insurrection, but that
where any such Negro, Mullatto, or Indian, shall, upon due Proof
made . . . be found to have given a false Testimony, every such Offender
shall, without further Trial, be ordered by the said Court to have one Ear
nailed to the Pillory, and there to stand for the Space of one Hour, and
then the said Ear to be cut off; and thereafter, the other Ear nailed in
like Manner, and cut off, at the Expiration of one other Hour; and
moreover, to order every such Offender Thirty-Nine Lashes, well laid on,
184
on his or her bare Back, at the common Whipping-Post.

Additionally, “[d]uring the Seven Years’ War, it became official policy
to kill Indian prisoners, whom in time many officers simply called
185
‘those Vermine.’”
Finally, the federal government itself was responsible for many
atrocities. For example, as discussed previously, in 1879, the government apprehended a group of Cheyennes who had escaped from the
reservation to which the federal government had forcibly removed
them. When the Indians refused to return,
The military authorities . . . resorted to the means for subduing the
Cheyennes by which a former generation of animal tamers subdued wild
beasts. In the midst of the dreadful winter, with the thermometer 40Ǒ be-

181
182
183

184
185

ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 53.
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 74 (quoting Letter from William Williamson, Subcommander
of the Georgia Guard, to Wilson Lumpkin, Governor of Georgia (Apr. 28, 1832) (internal
quotation marks omitted), available at http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/teinatamer-idx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&type=doc&tei2id=tcc537).
A COLLECTION OF ALL THE ACTS OF ASSEMBLY, NOW IN FORCE, IN THE COLONY OF VIRGINIA
339–341 (1733) [hereinafter A COLLECTION OF ALL THE ACTS].
SILVER, supra note 34, at 132; see also id. at 91 (describing a 1757 essay by Colonel James
Burd of Pennsylvania in which he “urg[ed] attacks on Indian villages”).
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low zero, the Indians, including the women and children, were kept for
five days and nights without food or fuel, and for three days without water. At the end of that time they broke out of the barracks in which they
were confined and rushed forth into the night. The troops pursued, fir186
ing upon them as upon enemies in war . . . .

Another example of such a federally sanctioned atrocity had occurred fifteen years earlier in 1864, when the United States “slaughtered at least 150 Cheyenne and Arapaho who had gathered near
187
Denver to make peace with the United States.”
As these few examples demonstrate, Indians were not at all safe in
colonial and early America, and, as shown above, the atrocities committed against them were implicitly or explicitly justified by the popular perception of Indians as savages who uniformly instigated attacks
188
on innocent whites.
E. Indians Were Historically Denied the Right to Self-Defense
In addition to being subjected to countless acts of violence, Indians were also historically denied the right to carry arms and, in
some cases, were explicitly denied the right to defend themselves.
Both types of laws appear to have been attempts to achieve the same
result, namely, to protect whites from Indians’ perceived violent or
savage tendencies, perceptions that stem largely from tribes’ justified
acts of self-defense. Moreover, these laws constitute clear-cut denials
of Indians’ rights to self-defense.
1. Historical Prohibitions on Indians’ Right to Defend Themselves
a. In 1705, Virginia Forbade Indians and Blacks from Raising
a Hand in Opposition to a Christian
Virginia’s draconian law provided for no qualifications or exceptions:
[I]f any Negro, Mulatto, or Indian, Bond or Free, shall at any Time lift his
or her Hand in Opposition against any Christian, not being Negro, Mulatto, or Indian, he or she so offending, shall, for every such Offence,
proved by the Oath of the Party, receive on his or her bare Back, Thirty

186
187
188

Conners v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 317, 322–23 (1898).
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 1.03[7].
See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 53 (quoting Georgian judges’ determination of Indians to be unsuited to govern themselves because of their “habits, manners, and imbecile intellect”).
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Lashes, well laid on; cognizable by a Justice of the Peace for that County
189
wherein such Offence shall be committed.

Thus, under this law, Indians, as well as blacks, were literally denied
any right to defend themselves, at least when the aggressor was a
white Christian. Moreover, it appears from the wording that all that
was needed to prove the violation of this law was for the alleged victim to claim under oath that a violation had occurred. It is difficult
to imagine more powerful evidence of subjugation than this wholly
one-sided law. The law also suggests an understanding of Indians
(and blacks) as dangerous aggressors who must be subject to harsh
penalties for the least transgression to prevent the chaos that would
otherwise ensue as a result of their irrational violent tendencies.
b. In the 1850s, the United States Forbade the Zuni Tribe
from Defending Against Raids and Harassment from Other
Tribes
In 1848 and 1850, the United States promised “to protect the Zunis from raiding Navajos, while the Zunis themselves were prohibited
from pursuing military campaigns against the Navajos without the
190
consent of the territorial authorities of Santa Fe.”
Nonetheless,
when the “Navajos continued raiding and harassing” the Zunis, the
United States not only forbade them “from taking any action to defend themselves,” but also “failed to provide [the] adequate protec191
tion” it had promised to the Zunis. Thus, we see again the view of
Indians as untrustworthy, presumably because of their violent (in
other words, “savage”) tendencies, being used to deny tribes the right
to self-defense even when the circumstances clearly indicate the need
for self-defense. Also apparent from this example is federal apathy
towards the plight of the Zunis, which may well stem from the perception of Indians in general as savage or uncivilized. As will be
shown below, such apathy continues today.
2. Prohibitions on Indians’ Bearing Arms and on Trading Arms and
Ammunition to Indians
Indians were historically forbidden from bearing arms under colonial, state, and federal law prohibitions, which constituted historical
denials of Indians’ (and tribes’) right to self-defense. Additionally,
189
190
191

A COLLECTION OF ALL THE ACTS, supra note 184, at 226.
Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 641, 646–47 (1987).
Id. at 647, 655.
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gun-rights advocate Don Kates has argued that the original intent of
192
the Second Amendment itself was to exclude Indians and blacks.
This interpretation comports with common sense, given that the
need for self-defense in the colonies and, specifically, the need for
militias, was originally grounded on the perceived need to defend
193
against Indian aggression.
a. Federal Prohibitions
i. The Uniform Militia Act Suggests That the Second
Amendment Was Intended to Exclude Indians
The first federal law enacted under the Second Amendment was
the Uniform Militia Act, which required white male citizens between
194
eighteen and forty-five to enroll in the militia.
It was enacted one
year after the Second Amendment was ratified and, therefore, pro195
vides good evidence of the original intent of the Amendment. On
its face, the Act excludes everyone but white men, at least from feder196
al service. Because the Uniform Militia Act bears on the intent behind the Second Amendment, its exclusion of everyone but white
men from federal militia service suggests that the “people” referred
to in the Amendment was originally meant to denote a group whose
197
membership was subject to race (and sex) restrictions.
From this
192
193
194
195

196

197

Kates, supra note 9, at 217 n.54.
See supra Part II.A.
See Uniform Militia Act of 1792, 1 Stat. 271 (repealed 1903).
See, e.g., Bogus, supra note 9, at 1373 n.47; cf. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2810 (stating that
“discussions [that] took place 75 years after the ratification of the Second Amendment . . . do not provide as much insight into its original meaning as earlier sources”);
Kates, supra note 9, at 266 (averring that “one can scarcely argue that the First Militia Act
violated the [Second] amendment”).
See, e.g., Bogus, supra note 9, at 1373 n.47; Williams, supra note 1, at 451; see also Ulliver &
Merkel, supra note 7, at 153 (“The act required that states carry their ‘able-bodied white
male citizens’ between the ages of eighteen and forty-four on the rolls . . . . But Congress
also implicitly left the states free to continue the practice of exempting various additional
categories of citizens . . . . Indeed, Congress also seemingly left open the question of
states including additional categories of persons—principally, free black males—in their
state militia rosters, even though no federal service requirement attached to them by virtue of the act.”). But see Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 22, at 332 (arguing that that the
Uniform Militia Act, while conscripting only white males, excluded no one from the nation’s militia).
This exclusion of Indians from the protections of the Second Amendment is part and
parcel with the historical denial of constitutional rights to other groups such as African
Americans and women. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403
(1856) (holding that “a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold
as slaves” could not “become a member of the political community formed and brought
into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all
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group, male Indians were excluded by virtue of not being white, as
198
well as, potentially, by their lack of citizenship. Given that Indians
were excluded from the militia, they would implicitly lack the right to
bear arms under the traditional individualist view of the Second
Amendment. Thus, their individual right to self-defense would be
partially abrogated under an originalist understanding of the Second
Amendment.
ii. Abraham Lincoln’s 1865 Proclamation
In 1865, President Abraham Lincoln issued a Proclamation that
“all persons detected in that nefarious traffic [of furnishing hostile
Indians with arms and munitions of war] shall be arrested and tried
199
by court-martial at the nearest military post.” While this Proclamation applied only to provision of arms to “hostile Indians,” the numerous references to “savage Indians” in the case law discussed above
suggest that hostility may well have been largely in the eye of the beholder. This and similar laws had the effect of indirectly denying Indians the right to bear arms and thus the right to effective selfdefense.
iii. Congressional Resolution of 1876 Prohibiting Conveyance
of Metallic Ammunition to “Hostile Indians”
The 1876 Resolution of the Forty-Fourth Congress is similar in
approach to President Lincoln’s Proclamation in that it also prohibited others from trading arms or related articles with allegedly hostile Indians:
Whereas, it is ascertained that the hostile Indians of the Northwest are
largely equipped with arms which require special metallic cartridges, and
that such special ammunition is in large part supplied to such hostile Indians . . . through traders and others in Indian country: Therefore, Resolved . . . That the President . . . is hereby authorized and requested to
take such measures . . . to prevent such special metallic ammunition be-

198
199

the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied [sic] by that instrument to the citizen”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (affording women suffrage as of 1920); Ariela
Gross, When is the Time of Slavery? The History of Slavery in Contemporary Legal and Political
Argument, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 298 (2008) (describing Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred
Scott as “a thoroughgoing exercise of . . . originalism”).
See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 93, at 159 (stating that Indians generally were not made United States citizens until 1924); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006).
Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation No. 28 (Mar. 17, 1865), reprinted in 13 Stat. 753 (1866).
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ing conveyed to such hostile Indians, and is further authorized to declare
200
the same contraband of war in such district of country . . . .

Thus, again, we see Indians being denied the right to bear arms—a
portion of the right to self-defense—through indirect measures.
iv. 1925–26 United States Code Prohibition on Sale of Arms
and Ammunition to Uncivilized or Hostile Indians
In 1925–26, a provision of the United States Code required the Secretary of the Interior to adopt rules and regulations to prohibit the
sale of arms or ammunition “within any district or country occupied
by uncivilized or hostile Indians,” and further provided that any Indian trader or trader’s agent who violated the rules would forfeit his
license to trade with the Indians and he or his agent would be ex201
cluded from the applicable district or country. When the law was in
202
place, such “trading posts were Indians’ only source of supplies.”
This law is particularly interesting in that it expands the earlier restriction to include “uncivilized” as well as hostile Indians. Presumably, many or most Indians would have been considered uncivilized at
203
that point in time, and the concept of a “civilized Indian” would
most likely have been reserved for someone who had cut ties with his
204
or her tribe and assimilated into white culture. Thus, the 1920s saw
200
201
202

203

204

H.R.J. Res. 20, 44th Cong., 19 Stat. 216 (1876).
25 U.S.C. § 266 (1925–26) (repealed 1953).
Associated Press, Government Drops Restrictions on Sale of Guns to Indians, WASH. POST, Jan.
6, 1979, at A11 (discussing more recent regulation that incorporated the language from
this statute); see also Regulating Sale of Arms and Ammunition, 44 Fed. Reg. 46 (Jan. 2,
1979) (also referring to the later federal regulation and noting that “[c]ircumstances
which gave rise to this rule no longer exist[]” and that “Indians are now able to purchase
arms and ammunition at any place they are lawfully for sale”).
For instance, in United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), decided just over ten years
before this statute was enacted, the Supreme Court rejected arguments that the Pueblo
were too advanced to have their lands considered Indian country under U.S. law:
The people of the pueblos, although sedentary rather than nomadic in their inclinations, and disposed to peace and industry, are nevertheless Indians in race, customs, and domestic government. Always living in separate and isolated communities, adhering to primitive modes of life, largely influenced by superstition and
fetichism [sic], and chiefly governed according to the crude customs inherited
from their ancestors, they are essentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior
people.
Id. at 37–39; see also ALEINIKOFF, supra note 95, at 27 (noting, “[t]hroughout the nineteenth century,” that Indians “were ‘uncivilized’ went without saying”).
See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 1.04 (discussing
the prominent view during the Allotment Period, which lasted from 1871 to 1928, that
“tribal autonomy” was a form of “savagery” and the popular demand “that Indians be absorbed into the mainstream of American life”); Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the
American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591, 606 (2009) (stating that, by the mid-eighteenth
century, laws began to reflect the view that “[s]eparated from his tribe, the Indian could
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an expansion of the groups of Indians who were denied the right to
bear arms potentially to include all tribal Indians.
v. Federal Regulations Prohibiting Arms Trading with
Indians
By 1939, the United States Code provision discussed above had been
transferred to the Code of Federal Regulations, where it remained, in
205
various incarnations, until 1979. The 1939 regulation was divided
between two sections of the Code of Federal Regulations. The first section, 25 C.F.R. § 276.6, substantially mirrored the United States Code
provision prohibiting the sale of arms and ammunition “within any
206
district or country occupied by uncivilized or hostile Indians.” The
second section, 25 C.F.R. § 276.8, went further and prohibited Indian
traders from selling arms and ammunition to the Indians “except
upon permission of the superintendent, which will be granted only
207
for clearly established lawful purposes.”
Thus, even Indians who
were regarded as civilized and friendly by the U.S. government would
have to prove a “clearly established lawful purpose” before they could
purchase a gun. There is evidence that discretionary gun-permitting
208
schemes are often enforced in a discriminatory manner, and there
is no reason to think that 25 C.F.R. § 276.8 would have been any different, especially given the entrenched stereotypes of Indians as violent and irrational. Again, then, we see that historically, large numbers of Indians were denied the right to bear arms, and even those
that were not so denied were subjected to special burdens.
These regulations were still in place and remained substantially
209
unchanged in 1949. By 1966, the first section, prohibiting sales to
uncivilized and hostile Indians, had been dropped from the Code of
Federal Regulations, and only the second section, requiring that arms
and ammunition not be sold to Indians “except upon permission of
the superintendent which will be granted only for clearly established
210
lawful purposes,” remained.
This section stayed in place until the

205

206
207
208
209
210

be civilized and would thereby add glory of [sic] the English race; tied to it, however, he
was the enemy of all civilization”).
25 C.F.R. §§ 276.7, 276.8 (1939); Regulating Sale of Arms and Ammunition, 44 Fed. Reg.
at 46 (revoking restriction on sale of arms and ammunition to Indians because of the obsolescence of the rule); Associated Press, supra note 202, at A11.
25 C.F.R. § 276.7.
Id. § 276.8.
See, e.g., Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 81.
25 C.F.R. §§ 276.7, 276.8 (1949).
25 C.F.R. § 251.8 (1966).
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rule was officially revoked in 1979 due to its obsolescence.
Thus,
Indians’ right to bear arms remained explicitly burdened by the law
until 1979.
While the federal regulations, United States Code provision, and earlier federal laws referred to Indians rather than tribes, it appears that
the laws were designed primarily to prevent collective military actions
by tribes. This goal is evident from the fact that the laws until 1966
looked to the character of the Indians in the area, presumably the
tribe or tribes, in determining the legality of sales, and either sanctioned or prohibited the sales on an across-the-board rather than an
individualized basis. Thus, the goal was most likely to prevent tribes
from engaging in collective violent action including acts of selfdefense, although Indians’ individual rights to bear arms were compromised in the process.
vi. Individual Tribes Were Also Deprived of the Right to
Self-Defense by the Federal Government
In addition to the statutes, regulations, and other laws discussed
above, the federal government also prohibited and prevented individual tribes from arming themselves in the face of direct attack, or
disarmed them and then attacked them, or used their disarmament
to gain accession to federal demands. For example, pursuant to
“general United States policy,” the Department of the Interior in
1849 refused to give arms and ammunition to the Zuni Tribe to allow
212
it to protect itself from attacks by the Navajos and Apaches. Moreover, the federal government, which had promised to defend the Zuni
213
from such attacks, failed to do so adequately, and the raids there214
fore continued, including kidknappings and livestock thefts.
Two other examples involve the Sioux Tribe. In one case, in
1876, the Sioux had been disarmed by the federal government and
then were threatened with denial of rations so that they would cede
their sacred Black Hills (which the federal government wanted be215
cause gold had been discovered there). Because the Indians traditionally hunted for food and did not know how to farm, without ei216
ther their weapons or government rations, they would have starved.
211
212
213
214
215
216

Regulating Sale of Arms and Ammunition, 44 Fed. Reg. 46 (Jan. 2, 1979).
Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 641, 645 (1987).
Id. at 654.
Id. at 645.
Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157, 1164–66 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 79.
Sioux Nation, 601 F.2d at 1166; Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 79.
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Thus, the federal government appears to have disarmed them not only to lessen their potential power as opponents, but also in order to
217
credibly threaten them with starvation.
Another important example involving the Sioux is the United
States’ infamous massacre at Wounded Knee, where it is estimated
that in December 1890, nearly 300 Sioux were killed, including many
218
women and children who died while fleeing. As a precursor to the
massacre, U.S. troops instructed the Sioux they were traveling with to
219
However, the troops were not satisfied that
surrender their guns.
all the weapons had been surrendered and began to search each
220
Sioux man.
When a gun went off, the troops began firing on the
tepees where the women and children were gathered, “pour[ing] in
2-pound explosive shells at the rate of nearly fifty per minute, mow221
ing down everything alive.”
Thus, as shown above, the federal government engaged in a regulatory and administrative policy of substantially restricting and often
prohibiting Indians’ ability to bear arms from 1792 until, at least for222
mally, 1979.
Such restrictions, along with federal actions directed
at individual tribes, had the literal effect of denying Indians individually, and the tribes to which they belonged collectively, the right to
bear arms. Moreover, formal restrictions on Indians’ bearing of arms
continued long after the Reconstruction-era efforts to remove formal

217
218

219
220
221
222

See Sioux Nation, 601 F.2d at 1166; see also Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 79.
Allison Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christianization
Policy in Twentieth-Century Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 797–98 (1997); see also
Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 79–80. The massacre was born out of the United States’ attempts to suppress a Sioux spiritual practice called the Ghost Dance, which the federal
government deemed to be dangerous. Dussias, supra , at 795–98.
Dussias, supra note 218, at 798; see also Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 79–80.
Dussias, supra note 218, at 798.
Id. at 798 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A news article from 1979 regarding revocation of the rule reports that the rule had “not
been used for many years.” Associated Press, supra note 202, at A11.
Despite this general federal history of denying Indians the right to arm themselves in
self-defense, there were occasional exceptions. For example, David Kopel examines three
Supreme Court cases involving Indian defendants from the 1890s in which the Supreme
Court overturned lower court murder convictions based in part on the defendants’ claims
that they were acting in self-defense. See generally David B. Kopel, The Self-Defense Cases:
How the United States Supreme Court Confronted a Hanging Judge in the Nineteenth Century and
Taught Some Lessons for Jurisprudence in the Twenty-First, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293 (2000). Ironically, the views of the trial judge discussed in Kopel’s article, whose death penalty convictions were overturned by the Supreme Court, were lauded and used as persuasive authority to defeat tribal criminal jurisdiction in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,
200 & n.10 (1978). Kopel, supra, at 298 & n.39; see infra notes 298-310 and accompanying
text (discussing Oliphant).

Mar. 2011]

THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND TRIBAL SELF-DEFENSE

735

223

restrictions on African Americans’ ability to bear arms.
While this
information should not be taken, by any means, to suggest that racism against African Americans has been overcome and racist laws
224
consequently abolished, it does suggest that Americans are more
cognizant of the problem of racism against African Americans and,
therefore, that overtly racist laws have become unacceptable. In contrast, our racism against Indians remains largely invisible to us, and
laws (including the Supreme Court’s federal common law decisions)
225
that racialize Indians may be more difficult to recognize.
Indeed,
stereotypes of Indian savagery allowed formal restrictions on Indians
carrying guns to remain in place until the late 1970s and have continuing harmful effects upon tribes today.
b. Colonial and State Prohibitions on Indians’ Bearing Arms
In addition to federal restrictions and prohibitions, the colonies
and states also historically outlawed Indians from bearing arms. Statutes banning Indians from owning or carrying guns were among the
first types of gun laws enacted by the colonies and early states, and
these laws continued to be in place, in some cases, well into the late
226
nineteenth century. A few examples, arranged chronologically, are
provided below.
In 1705, the colony of Virginia had two relevant laws in place.
The first, discussed above, forbade an Indian from raising his or her
227
hand in opposition to a Christian. The second allowed Indians to
fish, oyster, and gather plants provided that they first obtained a li-

223
224
225

226

227

Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 79; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783,
2809–11 (discussing post-Civil War laws enacted for the benefit of African Americans).
See, e.g., Burkett, supra note 13, at 97–99 (detailing “race neutral” gun control measures in
the 1960s that were actually aimed at restricting blacks from bearing arms).
Cf. Williams, supra note 104, at 86–87 (elucidating the fact that the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), represented a paradigm shift in the Court’s treatment
of African Americans and other minorities, but that this shift did not occur with respect
to Indian tribes).
State v. Hirsch, 114 P.3d 1104, 1126, 1127 (Or. 2005) (noting that “colonies tried to keep
arms out of the ‘wrong hands’ by forbidding . . . Native Americans from carrying certain
weapons” and that states continued firearm regulation designed to disarm Native Americans after the Revolutionary War period (citations omitted)); Burkett, supra note 13, at 63
(noting that colonial authorities “sought to disarm blacks and Indians” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Kates, supra note 9, at 241 n.156 (describing laws
prohibiting gun carrying and ownership by Indians and blacks as one of the four types of
early gun laws); Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 79 & n.51 (citing 1879 Idaho law that forbade the “sale or provision of firearms and ammunition to ‘any Indian’” (citation omitted)).
A COLLECTION OF ALL THE ACTS, supra note 184, at 226; see also supra Part II.E.1.a.
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cense from the Justice of the Peace, but prohibited them from carry228
ing arms and ammunition while doing so.
A 1723 Virginia law generally prohibited Indians and blacks from
possessing arms and ammunition, and provided a punishment of
229
whipping for violation. The law did, however, provide an exception
230
for Indians or blacks living on frontier plantations. However, even
they, if free, were required to first obtain a license from the Justice of
231
the Peace or, if enslaved, from the plantation owner.
A 1724 Boston law forbade Indians, blacks, and mulattos from carrying weapons and additionally “from assembling in groups larger
than two and from being on the streets from one hour after sundown
232
until one hour before sunrise.”
Oregon’s first firearms restriction
233
after statehood was directed at Native Americans. It became effective in 1864 and “prohibited selling or giving any firearms or ammunition to any Native American without the authority of the United
234
States.” Finally, in 1879, Idaho “prohibited the sale or provision of
235
firearms to ‘any Indian.’”
This sampling of historical state and colonial gun control measures directed at Indians demonstrates the extent to which states and
colonies, like the federal government, viewed Indians as untrustworthy (i.e. as savage) or, in other words, as violent and irrational. As a
result of this distorted perception, states and colonies worked to limit
Indians’ access to guns while allowing members of the dominant
236
white population to use and carry them.
The state attempts are
particularly striking given that, since the adoption of the Constitution, states have been generally considered barred from regulating

228

229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236

A COLLECTION OF ALL THE ACTS, supra note 184, at 231. The license required was also
quite restrictive, defining the amount of time the Indian fisher or gatherer was allowed to
engage in such activities. Id.
A COLLECTION OF ALL THE ACTS, supra note 184, at 342.
Id. at 231.
Id.
Bogus, supra note 9, at 1370 & n.31.
State v. Hirsch, 114 P.3d 1104, 1120 (Or. 2005).
Id.
Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at 79 & n.51.
This strategy is in sync with an often overlooked aspect of gun armament: it only affords
a true advantage if the other side is not so armed. See, e.g., Burkett, supra note 13, at 77
(“[T]he peculiar advantage of owning a repeating firearm like the Colt is not realized in a
gunfight against an equally armed opponent. Rather, it lies in the capacity of a technologically advanced weapon to enable its user to defeat larger numbers of less well-armed adversaries. In short, the gun permits its holder to transcend his perceived position of inferiority and to gain superiority over, rather than equality with, his adversaries.” (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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237

Indians, at least on-reservation.
Like the analogous federal laws,
these state and colonial laws raise elemental questions about the right
to self-defense, and in fact suggest that it was meant as a privilege for
the dominant white population to be used to subjugate and oppress
members of those unarmed minority groups who found themselves at
238
the other end of the gun barrel.
V. THE STEREOTYPES OF INDIANS AS WARLIKE SAVAGES ARE STILL USED
TO DEPRIVE TRIBES OF THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS TODAY
While formal restrictions on Indians’ gun ownership have now
been abolished, the American legacy of fear of Indians based on a
perception of savagery continues to plague tribes. Currently, al239
though other ramifications exist, the most salient effect of this fear
237

238

239

See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (striking down a Georgia law
that prohibited white persons from living on Indian land unless they had satisfied conditions imposed by state law).
See, e.g, Bogus, supra note 9, at 1369 (explaining that, in 1517, the “non-white world literally found itself looking down the barrel of a gun”); id. at 1370 (“Guns were important to
enforcing white control. The strategy was twofold: to keep guns out of the hands of
blacks and Indians and to keep white men well-armed.”); cf. Tahmassebi, supra note 17, at
79 (“The history of firearms prohibitions in regard to Native Americans presents
a[n] . . . example of the use of gun control to oppress and . . . exterminate, a non-white
ethnic group.”).
For instance, in June 2000, the Washington State Republican Party passed a resolution
“calling for the abolition of tribal governments” by “whatever steps necessary,” and the
resolution’s author specifically threatened the use of “the U.S. Army and the Air Force
and the Marines and the National Guard” to effect the abolition. Julie Titone, Resolution
Would End Tribal Sovereignty: If Indians Don’t Like it, Send in the Troops, GOP Delegate Says,
SPOKESMAN REV. (Spokane, Wash.), July 3, 2000, at A1 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The resolution was recognized as racist by both anti-racism organizations and tribal rights groups. Jim Camden & Julie Titone, Anti-sovereignty Resolution
Draws Fire; Some Call GOP Action Racist,; [sic] Others Say It’s Simply Misguided, SPOKESMAN
REV. (Spokane, Wash.), July 8, 2000, at A1; see also Berger, supra note 204, at 647 (“The
denigration of tribal governments . . . has lain at the heart of racism against Indian tribes.”). In a similar vein, in August 2010, New York City’s mayor offensively urged the
governor to enforce cigarette tax laws pertaining to on-reservation sales by getting himself
“a cowboy hat and a shotgun.” Sarah Moses, CNY Native Americans Call New York City
Mayor Bloomberg’s “Cowboy Hat” Remark Racist, SYRACUSE.COM (Aug. 24, 2010, 6:59 AM).
Other ramifications include race-based physical and verbal harassment of tribal members
who exercise treaty fishing rights, see generally Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse-Wis., 843 F. Supp. 1284 (D. Wisc. 1994) (holding
that Indians’ treaty fishing right was violated when protestors battered and assaulted them
to block their access to the waterfront), and dehumanizing views of Indians as bloodthirsty savages in advertising, see, e.g., Michael K. Green, Images of Native Americans in Advertising: Some Moral Issues, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 323, 324, 328–29 (1993). Even in the generally
very progressive realm of contemporary poetry, one can find examples of Indians being
portrayed as savages. For instance, in the poem “God Ode,” Kim Addonizio describes Indians as the metaphorical enemy of the speaker’s body. The poem begins: “Praise having
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is that tribes’ sovereign rights are diminished based on early case law
that defined them as savage. This abrogation of sovereignty, particularly jurisdiction over non-members, renders tribes very vulnerable to
outside depredations, effectively leaving them unable to defend
themselves.
A. Stereotypes of Savagery Are Implicitly at Work in Case Law
Robert Williams quotes Justice Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu v.
240
United States to explain how the racist precedents using the language of Indian savagery continue to plague current Indian law deci241
sions and to implicitly justify abrogation of tribal rights:
Justice Jackson focused his . . . dissenting opinion . . . upon the larger set
of constitutional values that were threatened by the Court’s holding . . . . “But once a judicial opinion rationalizes . . . an order [such as
the military order justifying Korematsu’s exclusion and detention] to
show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order . . . the
Court has for all time validated the principle of racial discrimination.” . . . [T]he principle validated in that opinion now “lies about like a
loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that
principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new
purposes.” . . . Jackson described what happens when the Supreme Court
reviews and approves a principle of racial discrimination as the doctrine
of the Constitution: “There it has a generative power of its own, and all
242
that it creates will be in its own image.”

In the case of tribes, Williams explains, the “racist precedents and
language of Indian savagery used and relied upon by the justices [of
the Supreme Court] . . . have most often worked . . . to justify denial
to Indians of important rights of property, self-government, and cul243
tural survival.” Thus, absent the stereotyping of savagery, “there is
usually no other stated justification to be found for the way that In244
dians are treated by the justices.” While Supreme Court Justices are
no longer likely to describe tribes as savages or to insert quotes in
their opinions that contain such language, they continue to rely on
the precedents that do use that language, precedents that not only

240
241
242
243
244

a body to be unhappy in,/ suffering the slings and staring unbelieving at the arrows/ bristling from your chest as the Indians creep closer.” KIM ADDONIZIO, God Ode, in LUCIFER
AT THE STARLITE 78 (2009).
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at xxv, 29.
Id. at 29 (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
Id. at xxv.
Id.
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were infected by racialized portrayals of Indians, but also, to a signifi245
These precedents decant extent were based on such portrayals.
nied tribes sovereign rights based in large part on the implicit justification of Indian savagery. When these precedents are relied upon
now, they are expanded (to use Williams’s terminology) to justify
even greater incursions upon tribal sovereignty. The same principle
applies to opinions produced by lower federal, as well as state, courts,
although, as discussed above, such courts are more likely to include
246
explicitly the language of savagism in opinions.
Thus, usually without appearing to do so, current Supreme Court
cases and other cases from the state and federal system validate, per247
petuate, and reinforce this racialization. In other words, given that
the language of Indian savagery stems in significant part from tribal
efforts to defend their homelands, Indians are still being punished
for their historical acts of self-defense. As this punishment has persisted for nearly 400 years in some cases, tribes cannot be said to have
any current right to self-defense, irrespective of whether or not they
can now buy guns or form militias. This is particularly true given that
the abrogations of tribal sovereignty that are based implicitly on the
imputation of savagery (and thus in significant part on past acts of
self-defense) literally render tribes defenseless against outsiders.
First of all, all five Supreme Court cases discussed in Part IV.B.3
have been cited in recent Supreme Court and other state and federal
248
court decisions. Since 1975, Worcester, for example, has been cited
in 392 state and federal cases, including thirty-five U.S. Supreme
245
246

247

248

See id. at 49 (discussing the Supreme Court’s continued reliance on Johnson, Worcester, and
Cherokee Nation).
But see id. at 121 (discussing Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in United States v. Sioux Nation, 448
U.S. 371, 437 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), in which the Justice, quoting a historian,
described the Sioux as “liv[ing] only for the day, recogniz[ing] no rights of property,
robb[ing] or kill[ing] anyone if they . . . could get away with it, inflict[ing] cruelty without a qualm, and endur[ing] torture without flinching”). Note that not only is an extremely violent, or savage, character imputed to the Sioux in this quote, but that the
Sioux people are also dehumanized based on their supposed immunity to pain, a characteristic that implies that we can justify doing whatever we want to them because they will
not feel it. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 437 (1980) (Rehnquist, dissenting). Thus, in this quote, former Chief Justice Rehnquist demonstrates how the language
of savagery can be used to justify violence against supposedly savage groups. Id.; see also
supra Part II.B & IV.D.
Cf. Anthony Cook, Cultural Racism and the Limits of Rationality in the Saga of Rodney King, 70
DENVER UNIV. L. REV. 297, 302 (1993) (“After centuries of life predicated on the assumptions of white supremacy, society finally reaches a point at which the assumptions no
longer need stating. They provide the backdrop for conversations, interactions and encounters that never utter a racist word, but yet reproduce the imagery of supremacy and
inferiority that perpetuates the subordination of blacks in society.”).
“Recent” here is defined as any case published after December 31, 1975.
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249

Court cases. A case with a decidedly more negative holding for tribes, Cherokee Nation has been cited in 268 state and federal cases since
1975, including twenty-two Supreme Court cases. Finally, Johnson, the
least positive for tribes out of these three Indian law decisions written
250
by Chief Justice Marshall, has been cited in 110 post-1975 state and
federal cases, including ten Supreme Court cases. As for Crow Dog, it
has been cited in a total of eighty-one state and federal court cases
since 1975, including seven Supreme Court cases. Lastly, Tee-Hit-Ton
has been cited in fifty-nine post-1975 state and federal cases, including three Supreme Court cases. The language of savagery lives on,
however, even in recent Indian law cases that do not cite to any of
these five cases. This is because recent opinions commonly cite earlier cases that have themselves relied on racialized precedents such as
these five cases. An extended example of how citation of early racialized decisions inscribes racism into current decisions is described below. Before delving into this example, however, I wish to provide a
brief overview of the status of tribes generally under federal law and
of the criminal and civil jurisdictional frameworks for cases arising
within reservations or involving tribes.
1. The Status of Tribes Under Federal Law
“[T]he relationship of Indian tribes to the National Government”
under federal law is widely understood to be “‘an anomalous one and
251
252
of a complex character.’”
For example, in Cherokee Nation, discussed earlier, tribes were held to be “‘domestic, dependent nations’
253
who enjoyed a ‘quasi-sovereign status’” under federal law. However,
later federal cases and other federal actions, such as the Allotment
Policy, which was in place from the 1880s through the 1920s, viewed
tribes as “wards of the state” and pursued an “aggressive policy of as254
similating tribal members” by confiscating tribal land and parceling

249
250
251

252
253

254

These counts include majority, concurring, dissenting, and plurality opinions.
See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 57, at 674.
See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 226 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted); see also Erich W. Steinman, Legitimizing American Indian Sovereignty: Mobilizing the
Constitutive Power of Law Through Institutional Entrepreneurship, 39 L. & SOC’Y REV. 759, 765
(2005) (describing tribes as holding an “anomalous and ambiguous status” under federal
law as they entered the 1970s).
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
Steinman, supra note 251, at 765 (quoting Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 7) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976) (referring to the Northern Cheyenne Tribe’s “quasi-sovereign” status).
Steinman, supra note 251, at 765.
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255

it out to individual Indians and non-Indians. The Allotment Policy
was followed by yet more reversals in federal policy, including the Indian New Deal of the 1930s, which reflected a legislative policy in favor of tribal self-determination, the termination era of the 1950s,
which constituted a reversion to harsh, assimilationist policies, and
the current self-determination era ushered in by President Nixon in
256
1970. Despite the fact that current legislative and executive policy
supports tribal self-determination, however, the Supreme Court has,
257
since its 1978 decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, consistently diminished sovereignty over non-members, largely on its own
258
initiative.
Great disparities in federal treatment of tribes in different eras
and even within the same era by different branches of government
are possible (1) because federal Indian law is largely a creature of
259
federal common law; (2) because Congress has been held to have
260
virtually unlimited “plenary power” over tribes; and (3) because the
Supreme Court has invested itself with the power to construct (and
especially to diminish) tribal sovereignty under federal law according
261
to its own policy determinations. The fact that court decisions and
statutes from eras of conflicting policy remain good law simultaneously has created a schizophrenic body of law, as Erich Steinman
sums up:
Lacking comprehensive constitutional foundations, federal Indian law
has been, as described by legal scholars, “bizarre” and a “middle-eastern
bazaar where practically anything is available.” . . . Indian law expert
Charles F. Wilkinson identifies two uniquely divergent lines of opinion issued by the Supreme Court. One set casts tribal governments as largely
autonomous under overriding federal authority but free of state control.
In the other, tribes are understood as wards of the federal government.
Indian law is “time-warped,” as conflicting rulings are based on laws or

255
256
257
258
259

260
261

See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Lone Wolf, or How to Take Property by Calling It a “Mere
Change in the Form of Investment,” 38 TULSA L. REV. 37, 43–47 (2002).
Steinman, supra note 251, at 765.
435 U.S. 191 (1978).
See Tweedy, supra note 57, at 674–83 (discussing the Court’s divestment of tribal sovereignty during the past three decades).
See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 207 (2004)(“Consequently we do not read
any of these cases as holding that the Constitution forbids Congress to change ‘judicially
made’ federal Indian law through this kind of legislation.”); see also, Tweedy, supra note
57, at 664 n.55 (describing the foundational decisions of Indian law as primarily federal
common law decisions).
See Tweedy, supra note 57, at 659–62, 659 nn.31 & 34 (describing and discussing the origins and virtually unlimited character of Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs).
See Tweedy, supra note 57, at 674–83 (discussing the Court’s divestment of tribal sovereignty during the past three decades).
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policy generated in different eras and reflect variants of these two interpretations of tribal status. The underlying ambiguity has resulted in
widely divergent perceptions—and rulings—even though “tribal sovereignty” has nonetheless remained an active principle. . . .
And as legal anthropologist Thomas Biolsi has pointed out, the contradictions within Indian law elicited (and still do today) continual challenges even to those tribal rights affirmed by specific court rulings.
Comparing Indian law to racial discrimination law, Biolsi asks “What
things would be like if the laws of slavery and the 13th through 15th
amendments to the Constitution were equally on the books, or if both
Plessy v. Ferguson . . . and Brown v. Board of Education were equally ‘good
262
law’ in the present.” Such conditions invite virtually ongoing litigation.

a. Criminal Jurisdiction for On-Reservation Crimes
The determination of criminal jurisdiction for on-reservation
263
crimes is so complicated as to have been termed a “maze” and a
264
“morass.”
Among the most troubling aspects of the maze are the
limitations on tribal jurisdiction effected by statute and by Supreme
Court decisions, which are discussed below.
i. Tribal Jurisdiction
In an Indian reservation, Indian allotment, or other dependent
265
Indian community, tribes have criminal jurisdiction over their
266
members as well as other Indians. However, under the Indian Civil
Rights Act, the sentences they may impose are limited generally to a
267
prison term of one year, a fine of $5,000, or both (although under a
268
2010 law called the Tribal Law and Order Act, tribes are able to impose sentences of up to three years and fines of up to $15,000 if cer262
263

264

265
266
267
268

Steinman, supra note 251, at 766–67 (citations omitted).
See generally AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS
WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 8 (2007) (reporting on the complex “maze”
of tribal, state, and federal law that makes it extremely challenging for Native American
victims of sexual violence to achieve justice).
Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent
Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1182 (2004) (“[T]he federal statutory scheme addressing
crimes in Indian country creates a confusing morass in which tribes, states, and the federal government may, depending on various factors, have exclusive or concurrent criminal
jurisdiction.”).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006) (defining “Indian country” as including Indian allotments,
Indian communities, and “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation”).
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006) (defining tribal “powers of self-government”); United States v.
Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004).
25 U.S.C. § 1302(7).
Indian Arts and Crafts Amendments Act of 2010, §§ 201–66, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124
Stat. 2258, 2261–62.
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269

tain requirements are met). Moreover, although tribes, being neither federal nor state actors, are not generally bound by constitution270
al provisions requiring protection of individual rights, most Bill of
Rights protections have been imposed on tribes through the Indian
271
Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The most notable exception in the crimi272
nal milieu is the right to counsel for an indigent defendant, although tribes that impose the stronger punishments now available
under the Tribal Law and Order Act must provide indigent defen273
dants with the right to an attorney.
274
Although under the Major Crimes Act, federal courts have jurisdiction over enumerated Indian-on-Indian felonies such as murder
and rape, some courts have held that tribal courts retain concurrent
275
jurisdiction in such cases.
Furthermore, the only federal review
276
available of a tribally imposed conviction is habeas corpus.
ii. Federal Jurisdiction
As noted above, the federal government has jurisdiction over certain major crimes committed by an Indian against an Indian on the
277
reservation. The federal government also has jurisdiction over onreservation crimes involving a non-Indian perpetrator and an Indian
269
270

271
272

273
274
275

276

277

25 U.S.C. § 1302; Indian Arts and Crafts Amendments Act of 2010 § 234(a).
See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 381–83 (1896) (stating that powers of the local government exercised by the Cherokee nation are not derived from the Constitution); Barta
v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation of South Dakota, 259 F.2d 553, 556–57
(8th Cir. 1958) (holding that because Indian tribes are not states, constitutional limits on
legislative actions by states under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not apply to
them).
25 U.S.C. § 1302.
See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 14.04[2] (noting
that the ICRA omits the Constitutional requirements of free counsel for indigent defendants and that ICRA’s legislative history “indicates that these omissions reflect a deliberate choice by Congress to limit its intrusion into traditional tribal independence”); Will
Trachman, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction After U.S. v. Lara: Answering Constitutional Challenges
to the Duro Fix, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 880 (2005) (“Thus even though state and federal
courts must provide indigent defendants with assistance of counsel free of charge, neither
the federal Constitution nor the terms of ICRA require tribes [to do so] in tribal
courts.”).
Indian Arts and Crafts Amendments Act of 2010 § 234(a)(2).
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
See, e.g., Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1995) (“That the tribes retain jurisdiction over crimes within the Major Crimes Act is the conclusion already reached by distinguished authorities on the subject.”).
25 U.S.C. § 1303; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978) (“[T]he
structure of the statutory scheme and the legislative history of Title I suggest that Congress’ failure to provide remedies other than habeas corpus was a deliberate one.”).
18 U.S.C. § 1153.
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and the

iii. State Jurisdiction
States have jurisdiction over crimes between one non-Indian and
280
Additionally, under a federal law
another within Indian country.
281
popularly known as Public Law 280, some states, as a substitute for
federal jurisdiction, have additional criminal jurisdiction over Indian
282
country. Although it is not entirely clear, it appears that tribes have
concurrent jurisdiction with states in these circumstances to the same
283
extent they otherwise would have had with the federal government.
In Alaska, matters are further complicated by the general absence of
Indian country, which appears to leave the state having broad juris284
diction over native villages, at least in the criminal context. Finally,
states have jurisdiction over crimes not in Indian country regardless
285
of the perpetrator’s and victim’s Indian status or lack thereof.
As this framework makes abundantly clear, determining what government has jurisdiction over a crime committed in Indian country is
no simple matter. Moreover, in some states, such as Oklahoma,
where extensive allotment has occurred, the determination of wheth278

279

280
281
282

283
284

285

Id. § 1152; see also Washburn, supra note 157, at 716–17 (discussing the framework of federal jurisdiction created by the Indian country statute, the Major Crimes Act, and the
General Crimes Act).
18 U.S.C. § 13; see also Washburn, supra note 157, at 716–17 (“[T]he Assimilative Crimes
Act[] provides that any state criminal law of the state in which the lands are located can
be assimilated if there is no federal criminal law on point.” (footnote omitted)).
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 621–22 (1881).
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006).
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 6.04[3] (explaining the
history of Public Law 280 and the state jurisdiction that it authorizes); see also MAZE OF
INJUSTICE, supra note 263, at 29 (“Public Law 280 is seen by many Indigenous peoples as
an affront to tribal sovereignty, not least because states have the option to assume and to
relinquish jurisdiction, a power not extended to the Indigenous peoples affected. In addition, Congress failed to provide additional funds to Public Law 280 states to support the
law enforcement activities they had assumed.”).
Tweedy, supra note 57, at 694.
Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 533 (1998) (“These [current
federal] protections, if they can be called that, simply do not approach the level of superintendence over Indians’ land that existed in our prior cases.”); MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 263, at 36–37 (“A combination of federal legislation and state and US [stet] Supreme Court decisions . . . has resulted in considerable confusion and debate over the
right of Alaska Native peoples to maintain tribal police and court systems.”); cf. COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 4.07[3][d] (“[The Alaska Court’s
decision] suggests that Alaska native villages retain authority over other matters connected to core tribal interests, regardless of the absence of Indian country.”).
See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 9.03[1].
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286

er an area is Indian country may take weeks or even months. Given
this framework and the fact that criminal perpetrators naturally try to
hide their identities and, in these circumstances, may also try to hide
287
their races, it is not surprising that there is considerable difficulty in
bringing criminals to justice or that such obstacles help create an atmosphere of lawlessness on many reservations.
a. Tribal Civil Jurisdiction
Tribal civil jurisdiction has become exceedingly complicated, and
a thorough analysis of the subject could easily span 100 or more pages. However, below is an abbreviated overview of the subject. Tribes
generally have regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction over their
members, whereas tribal jurisdiction over non-members has been in288
creasingly circumscribed.
Absent federal delegation or congres289
sional restoration of tribal sovereignty, the general rule of when tribes have civil jurisdiction over non-members was enunciated in
Montana v. United States:
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe
or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
290
tribe.

While Montana’s limitations on civil jurisdiction over non-members
originally only applied to tribal regulatory jurisdiction (rather than
adjudicatory jurisdiction) and applied only to non-Indian-owned fee
lands within reservations, the limitations have been expanded with

286
287

288
289

290

MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 263, at 34 (noting the difficulty in determining the status
of land in Oklahoma).
See ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN GENOCIDE 26
(2005) (listing examples to support the claim that both today and historically white men
who raped and murdered Indian women would try to attribute this crime to Indian men);
see also Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Methamphetamine: Casting a Shadow Across Disciplines and Jurisdictions, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1249, 1249-50 (2006).
See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 4.02 (highlighting
federally imposed limitations on tribal powers).
See generally Tweedy, supra note 57 (discussing the potential for congressional restoration
of tribal sovereignty); Ann E. Tweedy, Using Plenary Power as a Sword: Tribal Civil Regulatory
Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act After United States v. Lara, 35 ENVTL. L. 471, 473–74
(2005) (discussing delegation of federal power to tribes).
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981) (citations omitted).
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291

each new case heard by the Supreme Court.
Thus, for example,
under current law, jurisdiction over state rights-of-way through tribal292
ly owned land on the reservation is subject to a Montana analysis,
and, more importantly, ownership of land may have become merely
one factor in the analysis as to whether the Montana limitations on
293
tribal jurisdiction apply at all.
Furthermore, with respect to Montana’s consensual relationship exception, the Court has required that
there be a stringent nexus between the consensual relationship and
294
the tribe’s assertion of jurisdiction, and the Court has concluded
that land sales by non-members on the reservation are not “activities”
295
for purposes of the consensual relationship exception. Finally, the
Court has dismissed the applicability of the second exception, relating to the tribe’s health, welfare, political integrity, or economic security, when a tribe could not plausibly claim “catastrophic conse296
quences” as a result of the non-member’s actions. These are only a
few of the ways that the Court has limited the Montana language to
further narrow tribal jurisdiction. As I suggested in a previous article,
it is possible that the Montana exceptions’ primary function in the
297
Supreme Court is “to exist in theory but never actually apply.”
Thus, while tribes may legally exercise civil authority over nonmembers under Montana, they have had tremendous difficulty in getting the Supreme Court to enforce this right in individual cases.

291
292

293

294
295

296
297

See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 57, at 674–76, 678, 703 & nn.256 & 257 (listing various cases
where the Supreme Court limited tribal power).
See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (citing Montana as the “pathmarking case concerning tribal civil authority over nonmembers” and applying its analysis); see
also Tweedy, supra note 93, at 171 (analyzing Strate as narrowing the Montana holding to
apply only to certain circumstances).
See Tweedy, supra note 57, at 678 (summarizing Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), in
which the Supreme Court held that a tribal member could not bring a § 1983 claim
against a state officer who executed a search warrant on tribal land).
See id. (discussing Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001), and its changes to
the Montana test).
See id. at 681 (examining Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct.
2709 (2008), in which the Supreme Court held that a tribal court did not have jurisdiction to hear a discrimination case seeking to set aside the sale of fee land on a reservation
pursuant to a deed of trust and requesting a variety of other remedies).
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2726 (2008).
Tweedy, supra note 57, at 682.
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2. An Extended Example of the Language of Savagery at Work in Supreme
Court Case Law
298

In Oliphant, the Court relied on very questionable sources, such
as “unspoken assumption[s]” and withdrawn administrative opinions,
to effect a devastating blow to tribal sovereignty, the revocation of tri299
bes’ criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
As further discussed
below, this holding has played a substantial part in exposing tribes to
300
widespread lawlessness nationwide, thus rendering tribes literally
301
unable to defend themselves from violence.
In Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Oliphant, he quoted
Crow Dog, including the Crow Dog opinion’s most offensive passage
emphasizing that it would be unfair to “measure[] the red man’s re302
venge by the maxims of the white man’s morality.”
However, Justice Rehnquist carefully elided the portions of the Crow Dog passage
that defined Indians as savages because he was using the Crow Dog
passage in Oliphant to underscore that it would be unfair to outsiders
(namely whites) to allow Indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdic303
tion over them. He was thus putting whites in the place of the Indian defendant in Crow Dog, but could hardly convincingly describe
304
whites as savages, as this would not only presumably conflict with his
own worldview but would also lack cultural resonance. By making
this strategic use of ellipses, Justice Rehnquist was able to preserve a
sanitized version of the offensive language in Crow Dog and then use it
to deny Indians the right to criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
The racialized language of savagery from Crow Dog was therefore at
work in Oliphant, but in a way that would not have been readily ascer-

298
299

300

301

302
303
304

435 U.S. 191 (1978).
Id. at 203 (relying on Congress’ “unspoken assumption” that tribes lacked such jurisdiction); see also Tweedy, supra note 93, at 151–52 (noting the “dubious evidence” supporting
the Court’s decision in Oliphant).
See, e.g., Trachman, supra note 272, at 854 (“The Oliphant decision led to an atmosphere
of lawlessness on tribal reservations and substantially hindered the ability of tribal governments and police to combat crimes committed by non-Indians on reservations.”).
For an example of a tribal court case that analyzes the question of criminal jurisdiction
over non-members (in this case non-member Indians) as a self-defense issue, see Means v.
District Court of the Chinle Judicial Dist., 7 Navajo Rptr. 383, 386 (1999), available at
http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinions/1999.NANN.0000013.htm (noting that “[t]he
social health of the Navajo Nation is at risk . . . as is the actual health and well-being of
thousands of people” as a result of non-member on-reservation crime).
WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 109 (quoting Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210–11 (1978); Ex Parte
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 536, 571 (1883)).
See id. at 108–09 (examining Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning in Oliphant).
Id.
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305

tainable to one not versed in Indian law. Moreover, the notion of
tribes as untrustworthy that pervades Oliphant can be linked to the
stereotype of savagery, specifically, to the conception of tribes as un306
predictable aggressors.
In Oliphant, Justice Rehnquist also made use of Johnson, Cherokee
Nation, and Worcester. He used the doctrine of discovery from Johnson
as a springboard for the idea that Indian tribes’ rights are necessarily
implicitly “‘diminished’” in myriad ways as a result of their incorporation into the United States—ways that, based on Oliphant and subsequent Supreme Court decisions, appear to remain obscure until the
307
Court elucidates them. Justice Rehnquist similarly used Cherokee Nation’s somewhat limited acknowledgement that, because tribes were
“completely” under the sovereignty of the United States, a foreign nation’s attempt to acquire either their land or a connection with them
would be considered an affront to the United States to support the
expansive holding that tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over non308
Indians for crimes committed on the reservation.
Finally, Justice
Rehnquist questionably used Worcester to support the notion that the
Suquamish Tribe’s generic acknowledgement of “dependence” on
the United States in its treaty actually signified that the tribe consented to cede its criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to the feder309
al government.
Thus, Oliphant demonstrates that the elements of racial animus in
Chief Justice Marshall’s trilogy of Indian law decisions have functioned to exponentially reduce tribal sovereignty, despite the positive
310
aspects of the early decisions.
In other words, as Justice Jackson
recognized in his Korematsu dissent, the racist principle, once validated in a judicial opinion, “‘lies about like a loaded weapon ready
305
306

307
308

309

310

See id. at 108–10 (“[T]he same basic nineteenth-century racist attitude of Indian cultural
inferiority found in Crow Dog is now being applied to Indians once again . . . .”).
Accord Kates, supra note 9, at 217 n.54 (“The original intention [of the Second Amendment] would unquestionably also have been to exclude Indians and blacks on the
grounds of alienage or untrustworthiness.”).
See WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 98 (quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191, 209 (1978)).
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208–09 (1978); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 99 (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18–19
(1831)).
See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206-07 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832)); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 106–07 (analyzing Rehnquist’s use of Worcester in Oliphant). This holding is completely at odds with Worcester in that the Court in
Worcester was careful to construe tribal cessions made in treaties narrowly. See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 57, at 671–72.
See Tweedy, supra note 57, at 673–74 (discussing the positive aspects of the three decisions).
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for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim
of urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply
311
in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes.’”
Oliphant was not only a highly significant blow to tribal rights in its
own right, but, importantly, the Court has also expanded it exponen312
tially to reduce tribal sovereignty even further.
Thus, even when
the antecedent decisions that Oliphant was based on are not themselves cited, the racialized language of savagery in them continues to
operate through Oliphant and its progeny to deprive tribes of their
sovereign rights. Indeed, Oliphant has been cited in 265 federal and
state cases, including twenty-two Supreme Court cases, since it was
decided in 1978.
Moreover, both Oliphant and Worcester were cited in the Court’s
313
2008 decision, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.
In Long Family Land & Cattle, the Court further reduced tribes’ already drastically curtailed sovereignty over non-members, overturning a tribal court jury verdict in a discrimination case against a non314
member bank on the basis that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction.
The Long Family Land & Cattle Court expanded further Oliphant’s
holding that tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-members,
and it also expanded the holdings of subsequent cases extending Oli315
phant’s holding to the civil context.
One such intervening case,
316
Montana v. United States, had expanded Oliphant’s idea of implicit
abrogations of tribal sovereignty due to alleged inconsistence with the
311
312

313
314

315

316

WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 29 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246
(1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 137–48 (discussing the Court’s use of Oliphant in
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001)); see also Tweedy, supra note 57, at 675–83 (discussing
the Court’s trend of divesting tribal sovereignty as beginning with, and being rooted in,
Oliphant).
128 S. Ct. 2709, 2718–19, 2723 (2008).
Id. at 2720 (holding that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to hear a discrimination
claim against defendant bank because the tribe lacked the civil authority to regulate the
bank’s sale of its fee land); see also Tweedy, supra note 57, at 679–83 (discussing how Long
Family Land & Cattle further reduced tribal sovereignty).
See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 374–75 (2001) (holding that tribes have no jurisdiction to adjudicate claims that state officials violated tribal law in the performance of
their duties); State v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459–60 (1997) (holding that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a civil tort claim because tribal adjudication is not necessary to protect tribal self-government); Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 566–67 (1981) (holding that the tribal court lacked civil jurisdiction to adjudicate claims involving non-Indian hunters and fishers on non-Indian fee land). All three
cases are cited in Long Family Land & Cattle, 128 S. Ct. at 2718–19.
Montana, 450 U.S. at 549 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978)); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 104, at 139 (describing how Montana expanded Oliphant’s jurisdictional limitations to the civil sphere).
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tribes’ dependence on the United States to the civil arena.
As alluded to above, Montana had held that tribes’ civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-member activities on non-Indian owned fee land within
the reservation was abrogated as a result of the tribes’ dependent relationship except in certain circumstances, such as when the nonmembers had entered into consensual relationships with the tribe or
318
its members.
As one of the remedies the plaintiffs sought in Long Family Land &
Cattle was setting aside the defendant bank’s foreclosure sale of their
property, the Court was able to decide the case without rigorously examining the Montana rule. Instead, the Court paradoxically held that
the Montana rule was not at all applicable because land sale was not
319
an “activity” under Montana. Thus the Court used Oliphant implicitly through Montana to derogate tribal rights.
The Court in Long Family Land & Cattle also cited Oliphant directly
for the proposition that tribes have lost the right to govern anyone in
320
their territory except themselves.
Oliphant’s use of that statement
was limited to tribal criminal jurisdiction; it had since been expanded
321
to civil jurisdiction subject to the exceptions laid out in Montana.
317
318

319

320

321

Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66 (expanding the Oliphant principles to hold that the tribe
lacked jurisdiction in a civil regulatory matter).
Id. at 565 (“A tribe may regulate . . . the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.”).
Long Family Land & Cattle, 128 S. Ct. at 2724 (distinguishing the resale of land from the
uses to which the land is put); see also Tweedy, supra note 57, at 679–82 (discussing the
Court’s decision in Long Family Land & Cattle, including the opinion’s failure to reckon
with the Montana exceptions).
Long Family Land & Cattle, 128 S. Ct. at 2719 (citing Oliphant to support the proposition
that tribes have no right to govern anyone in their territory besides themselves). Interestingly, in making this statement, the Oliphant Court is itself quoting an 1810 case called
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147 (1810), which states that “[a]ll the restrictions
upon the right of soil in the Indians, amount only to an exclusion of all competitors from
their markets; and the limitation upon their sovereignty amounts to the right of governing every person within their limits except themselves.” Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978) (citing Fletcher for the proposition that the overriding sovereignty of the United States restricts tribal authority from governing people other than
themselves). However, as might be expected, Oliphant is expanding the principle, which
was not only dicta in Fletcher but also appears to be more of an assertion of the federal
government’s right to regulate outsiders within Indian reservations than a derogation of
the tribes’ rights to do so. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 147 (mentioning limitations on
tribal authority to govern outsiders in a paragraph describing the United States’ legal interests in Indian lands).
Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (“Though Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in
criminal matters, the principles on which it relied support the general proposition that
the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.” (citation omitted)).
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The Long Family Land & Cattle decision represents yet another expansion, apparently holding that tribes may not regulate land sales involving non-members even if a consensual relationship has been es322
tablished. Thus, the principles of Oliphant were used in Long Family
Land & Cattle to implement yet another novel limitation on tribal
rights. Without the specter of savagery, it is hard to see why the court
has so much difficulty in entrusting tribes with the territorial jurisdiction that is rightfully theirs.
Worcester is also cited in Long Family Land & Cattle in a puzzling
323
and somewhat misleading way. Worcester held that Georgia lacked
jurisdiction over the Cherokee Nation’s tribal territory and concomitantly emphasized the Cherokee Nation’s right to decide who entered
324
its territory.
But Chief Justice Roberts uses Worcester’s holding to
support his statement that tribes lack jurisdiction over their reservations unless they actually own the land: “[b]y virtue of their incorporation into the United States, the tribe’s sovereign interests are now
325
confined to managing tribal land.” Worcester nowhere suggests that
land ownership inside a reservation is determinative of tribal jurisdiction; the relevant boundary in Worcester is that between tribal and
326
state territory.
Thus, we can only assume that Worcester’s dark side
of the racial stereotyping is at work in the Long Family Land & Cattle
majority decision, expanding the savagery language beyond the stereotyping’s original use in Worcester to overshadow that case’s true
holding.
In addition to the difficulties that the holding in Long Family Land
327
& Cattle poses for tribes, the tone of the decision is overtly dismis-

322
323

324

325
326

327

Long Family Land & Cattle, 128 S. Ct. at 2724–25.
Id. at 2723 (citing Worcester to support the proposition that “[b]y virtue of their incorporation into the United States, the tribe’s sovereign interests are now confined to managing
tribal land”).
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves . . . .”).
Long Family Land & Cattle, 128 S. Ct. at 2723.
See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561 (“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of
Georgia can have no force . . . . The whole intercourse between the United States and this
nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.”).
See Tweedy, supra note 57, at 687–88 & n.171 (describing how Long Family Land & Cattle
negatively impacts tribes’ ability to protect their governmental interests, specifically how
inability to enforce anti-discrimination laws against non-members will lead to job and opportunity losses).
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sive of tribes and tribal rights.
Moreover, the analysis in the opinion is often facile, avoiding the difficult task of truly applying the
Court’s complicated Indian law precedents and announcing rules for
329
the first time while proclaiming that they are well-established.
These aspects of the decision independently harm tribes and negatively affect how society views them, affirming societal racialization of
330
tribes.
B. The Continuing Stereotype of Indians as Savage May Also Be Driving
the Federal Government’s Failure to Effectively Deal with Epidemic
Levels of On-Reservation Violent Crime
The continuing societal racialization of Indians and tribes and,
specifically, the stereotype of savagery, undoubtedly has effects

328

329

330

For instance, the Long Family Land & Cattle Court accuses the Longs of “attempt[ing] to
recharacterize their claim,” 128 S. Ct. at 2720, although the alleged recharacterization is
actually comprised of the Longs’ valid argument that the case arose out of the defendant’s failure to provide them with promised loan moneys. Additionally, the Court appears glib about federal actions, such as diminishing the reservation land-base by parceling out the reservation pursuant to the General Allotment Act, that have undoubtedly
caused untold grief for the tribe and its members. For instance, the Court states that, although the reservation was “[o]nce a massive, 60-million acre affair,” it “was appreciably
diminished by Congress in the 1880s” Id. at 2714–15. At another point, the Court states:
“[t]hanks to the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887 . . . there are millions of acres of
non-Indian fee land located” within reservations. Id. at 2719. The Court’s implicit expression of satisfaction that the federal government has inflicted these harms upon tribes
can only indicate disrespect of their position and an utter lack of empathy towards them.
Such language can be expected to further alienate tribes and make them even less likely
to trust in the court system. See Nathalie Des Rosiers, From Telling to Listening: A Therapeutic Analysis of the Role of Courts in Minority-Majority Conflicts, 37 COURT REV. 54, 57, 60, 60
n.48 (2000) (arguing that courts must carefully choose “therapeutic” language to avoid
exacerbating the tension between majority and minority groups).
For instance, the Court focuses exclusively on the tribal court’s jurisdiction to enforce
one of the remedies sought by the plaintiffs for the alleged discrimination, the setting
aside of the bank’s subsequent sale of the land, rather than undertaking the required
(and unquestionably more difficult) analysis of whether the tribal court had jurisdiction
over the discrimination claim itself, for which the plaintiffs had sought both legal and
equitable remedies. See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 57, at 680. The Court then sidesteps the
applicability of the Montana exception by concluding that land sales are not activities
within the meaning of Montana. Long Family Land & Cattle, 128 S. Ct. at 2722–23 & n.1
(creating a distinction between land use and land sale). Not only does the Court adopt
this conclusion, which is questionable in itself, but it also avers, without any basis whatsoever, that “[t]he distinction between sale of land and conduct on it is well-established in
our precedent.” Id. at 2723.
See, e.g., Des Rosiers, supra note 328, at 56–58, 59–60 (using a case study on Quebec to
illustrate how lack of nuance in court language can exacerbate pre-existing tensions rather than resolve a conflict).
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beyond the judicial abrogation of tribal sovereignty.
One area
where these stereotypes may well be at work is the federal government’s failure, at least up to this point, to deal effectively with violent
crime on reservations. As I discussed in a previous article, American
Indians are more often victimized by violent crime than any other
332
group, and Native women are especially at risk.
Indeed, Native
women are 2.5 times more likely to be raped than other women, and
333
one in three Native women will be raped in her lifetime. In a 2007
report on the subject, Amnesty International found that “Indian
women face considerable barriers to accessing justice,” and the organization charged the U.S. government with “interfer[ing] with the
ability of tribal justice systems to respond to crimes of sexual vi334
olence.” Not only has tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
been abrogated, as we saw in Oliphant, but it appears that federal
prosecutors, who are responsible in most states for prosecuting the
335
majority of serious crimes on Indian reservations, rarely prosecute
336
violent crime in Indian country. Thus, tribes are largely powerless
to deal with this epidemic violence. In other words, without the recognized sovereign powers over non-Indians that the Supreme Court,
in cases such as Oliphant and Long Family Land & Cattle, has abrogated, tribes cannot defend themselves, and the federal government
has failed, at least up until now, to effectively defend them.
As noted above, a significant portion of this problem is attributable to Oliphant’s divestment of tribal criminal jurisdiction and the ste337
reotypes of savagery that are at play in that decision. Additionally,
although several Senate Committee hearings have now been conducted on the issue and legislation that takes limited steps to remedy
331
332
333
334
335

336
337

See, e.g., supra note 239 and sources cited therein (discussing Spokesman Review articles and
Stop Treaty Abuse-Wisconsin).
Tweedy, supra note 57, at 690 (discussing the rate of sexual violence against Native women and the obstacles they face when seeking justice).
Id. at 689.
Id. at 690–91 (citations omitted).
Id. at 692–95 (discussing the Major Crimes Act’s grant of federal jurisdiction over enumerated felonies perpetrated by Indians and the Indian Country Crimes Act and Assimilative
Crimes Act’s grants of federal jurisdiction over interracial on-reservation crimes that involve both non-Indians and Indians); see supra notes 277-79 (discussion federal criminal
jurisdiction).
Id. at 691 (suggesting U.S. Attorneys prosecute as few as 15% of felony cases referred to
them by tribal prosecutors).
See Trachman, supra note 272, at 854 (noting that Oliphant played an important role in
causing lawlessness on Indian reservations); Tweedy, supra note 57, at 684–95 (explaining
the practical effects of the divestment of tribal sovereignty); see also Krakoff, supra note
264, at 1111–12 (describing the effects of the federal government’s divestment of sovereignty on the Navajo Nation).
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the problem has recently passed, it is unclear why the problem was
allowed to become so dire before meaningful steps were taken. It
may well be that the stereotypes of savagery at play in the decisions
divesting tribal sovereignty have also been working to make the safety
of Indian reservations such a low priority that some have credibly ac339
cused the federal government of genocide. In other words, it is entirely possible that the current lawlessness on Indian reservations is a
continuation of the pattern of unpunished vigilantism and de jure violence against Indians that was prevalent in colonial and early American periods. America’s othering of Indians as savage, which stemmed
largely from their acts of self-defense, may still be implicitly justifying—or at least facilitating—the nation’s current failure to defend
them—and failure to allow them to defend themselves—from perpetrators of on-reservation violent crime, including the predominantly
340
non-Indian perpetrators of the rape of Indian women.
VI. AMERICA NEEDS TO RECKON WITH ITS RACIALIZED HISTORY AND
POTENTIALLY REEVALUATE THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND KEY INDIAN
LAW PRECEDENTS
A. The Implications of Heller for Indians on Reservation Lands Are Unclear
First of all, tribes as governments need not provide Second
Amendment protections to those within their jurisdiction. This is because tribes, being neither state nor federal actors, are not required
341
to provide constitutional rights to those within their jurisdiction.
342
Furthermore, the Indian Civil Rights Act includes no Second
Amendment analog, despite its imposition of obligations on tribes to
protect several rights that are framed in language similar to that of

338

339
340
341

342

Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 §§ 201–66, Pub. L. No. 111-211, (2010); see also Tweedy,
supra note 57, at 709 (discussing Senate Committee on Indian Affairs hearings addressing
law enforcement and administration on tribal lands).
Tweedy, supra note 57, at 684 & n.160 (citing multiple sources that characterize divestment as part of genocide).
Tweedy, supra note 57, at 690 (reciting that 86% of the perpetrators of rape against Indian women are non-Indian men).
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 381–83 (1896) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is a limitation only upon the powers of the General Government. . .”); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation of S.D, 259 F.2d 553,
556–57 (8th Cir. 1958) (“The Indian tribes are not, however, states and these Constitutional limitations have no application to the actions, legislative in character, by Indian
tribes.”).
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–03 (2006).
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the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights. Thus, tribes could enact their
own restrictions on gun ownership irrespective of Heller, and it ap344
pears that a number of tribes do currently regulate gun ownership.
More importantly for the purposes of this Article, it is not entirely
clear that the Court would interpret Heller to prohibit the federal
government from banning firearms in Indian country. The Supreme
Court has held Congress to have exceedingly broad “plenary power”
345
over tribes, and, at least partially as a result of this power, Indians
(and tribes) have had mixed success when they have tried to enforce
346
federal constitutional rights in the courts. Thus, it is a real possibil343

344

345
346

Id. § 1302 (listing several rights that may not be infringed by tribal governments, including free exercise of religion, security against unreasonable search and seizures, and
double jeopardy protections); Robert Laurence, Don’t Think of a Hippopotamus: An Essay
on First-Year Contracts, Earthquake Prediction, Gun Control in Baghdad, the Indian Civil Rights
Act, the Clean Water Act, and Justice Thomas’s Separate Opinion in United States v. Lara, 40
TULSA L. REV. 137, 143 (2004) (noting differences between the ICRA and the Bill of
Rights).
See, e.g., Absentee-Shawnee Tribe of Indians of Okla., Res. No. AS-94-01 (Jan. 3, 1994),
available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/codes/absshaw/Crimoff.html (enacting a general ban
on the carrying of firearms on the person “except as may otherwise be provided for in the
Code of Laws of the Absentee-Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma”); see also Criminal Code Offenses & Punishments, SILETZ TRIBAL CODE § 12.126 (1992) (amended 2005) (criminalizing the carrying of a machine gun without a federal license and defining other, similar offenses).
Tweedy, supra note 57, at 659–60 & nn.31 & 34 (discussing the plenary power doctrine).
See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 14.03[2][a]; see
also Lyng v. Nw. Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 440, 451 (1988) (holding that
the Free Exercise Clause did not prevent the federal government from engaging in timber harvesting and road building on federal lands, even assuming that the federal activities would “virtually destroy the . . . Indians’ ability to practice their religion” (citation
omitted)); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 644, 649 (1977) (denying Indian defendants’ equal protection claim based on their having been tried under federal law for
felony murder because they were Indians whose crime occurred on a reservation, whereas
non-Indians who committed the same actions off-reservation would not be subject to
murder charges under the applicable state’s laws); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,
348 U.S. 272, 284–85 (1955) (holding that a tribe is not entitled to compensation under
the Fifth Amendment for a federal taking of timber on lands to which the tribe held aboriginal title); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1831) (holding that
tribes are not “foreign nations” and therefore that they are not entitled to invoke the
Court’s original jurisdiction in order to sue states); Washburn, supra note 157, at 751–55
(describing federal courts of appeals cases in which Indian defendants have unsuccessfully sought to enforce their Sixth Amendment rights regarding jury pool composition); id.
at 715–16, 741–75 (describing the federal criminal justice framework for crimes that occur in Indian country, and arguing that this framework may well violate several constitutional rights of Indian defendants and their respective tribal communities, including
rights based on the Sixth Amendment and those existing under the First Amendment);
cf. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 58, § 5.04[2][c] (explaining
that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause does apply to federal takings of Indian lands in
cases where the federal government had previously recognized Indian title). See generally
Singer, supra note 255, at 43–47 (explaining how the government’s non-consensual al-
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ity that, despite Heller, the Court would uphold a federal firearms ban
that applied to Indians on reservations. This possibility demonstrates
the uncertainty that even today surrounds Indians’ attempts to enforce the constitutional rights afforded to everyone else in the populace, including the individual right to self-defense enunciated in Heller. Additionally, if tribes were to assert a collective right to selfdefense against some sort of armed attack by the United States, an
individual state, or some other entity, it seems almost certain that a
federal court, in accordance with the examples from American history discussed above, would hold that no such right existed, most likely
because it was implicitly divested by virtue of tribes’ dependent sta347
tus. To put this example in concrete terms, imagine that, as a GOP
348
delegate advocated in 2000, the United States armed forces were
summoned to go onto reservations and forcibly dismantle tribal governments. Would tribes be held to have a legal right to fight back?
Probably not. Thus, despite the Second Amendment’s intent to protect against federal tyranny, a goal that many see as archaic today, Indian tribes remain under the shackles of federal tyranny in the form
of congressional plenary power and the decisions of a Supreme Court
that often appears openly hostile to their sovereign rights.
Not only do tribes lack a right to self-defense in the sense that they
are still being punished for past acts of self-defense, and in that the
incursions on their sovereignty that constitute this punishment render them unable to defend themselves against outsider depredations,
but it is also uncertain whether individual Indians on reservations can
reap the benefits of Heller. Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that a
tribe could successfully assert a collective right to self-defense.
B. Where to Go from Here?
What does the troubled relationship detailed above between Indians and non-Indians mean for the Second Amendment? Regard-

347

348

lotment of tribal property, as sanctioned by the Court in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553 (1903), constituted a taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment).
See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 57, at 659 (describing the origins of the doctrine of implicit
divestiture); see also Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet,) at 17–18 (“[A]ny attempt [by a foreign nation] to acquire . . . [tribal] lands, or to form a political connexion
with . . . [Indian tribes located within the United States], would be considered by all as an
invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility.”); supra note 251 and accompanying text
(addressing Oliphant’s use of the doctrine). One practical illustration of tribes’ lack of a
collective right to self-defense is that tribes with reservations near an international border
were left out of the federal Homeland Security funding scheme. See generally Jim Adams,
Homeland Security Funding a Disgrace, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (July 2, 2004).
See supra note 239 (discussing Spokesman Review articles).
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less of whether the Heller Court is correct as a historical matter that
the Amendment was intended to incorporate an individual right to
bear arms, the Amendment itself is based in significant part on our
gross misperceptions of Indians. This is because if the Amendment is
militia-based, as the collective rights view and the traditional individualist view understand it to be, then a racialized view of Indians is
inherent in the fact that the militias were originally designed to defend against what were perceived as tribal acts of unprovoked, savage
aggression (although in fact the Indians were in many cases defending themselves and their property). Moreover, Heller’s latter-day individualist conception is based in part on the Pennsylvania Declaration
of Rights, a document that historically stemmed from racialized conceptions of tribes. Additionally, the Heller Court appears to have only
been able to conceive of tribes in a one-dimensional, racialized way—
as a force to defend against. Thus, under any of the dominant interpretations of the Amendment, it is infused with racialized perceptions of Indians.
This problem is different and deeper than that involving other
rights, such as voting, that were originally applied in discriminatory
ways. This is because the Second Amendment itself incorporates our
conception of the other; in other words, the right could not logically
exist unless there were some other “bad” group that the good upstanding citizens needed to defend themselves from, either as a militia
349
or on an individual basis.
Without this other, the Amendment
would be considered obsolete, a mere relic of history. Instead, the
Amendment and the rights it is thought to encompass excite a great
deal of passion and controversy. Nonetheless, despite this problem
and the arguments of some scholars that the Amendment should be
considered legally defunct, at this point in time, it is not realistic to
consider amending the Constitution to remove the Amendment, and
even if the Amendment were repealed, the stereotypes of savagery
would continue to do dangerous work in other contexts. Thus, we
must start unraveling these stereotypes now. We must take a serious
look at our history, and we must question all our assumptions about
tribes and Indians.
Moreover, this reevaluation must be undertaken not just with respect to the right of self-defense, viewed narrowly, and the Second
Amendment, but also with respect to key Indian law precedents that
affect tribal self-defense in a broader sense. To the extent that these
precedents are substantively affected by notions of savagery (and
349

See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 1; Bogus, supra note 9.
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many appear to be), they should not be relied upon, particularly in
deciding issues of tribal sovereignty. And care should be taken to
protect tribal and individual Indians’ constitutional rights. At least in
cases where there is no conflict between a tribe’s sovereignty and an
350
individual Indian’s asserted constitutional right, there is no reason
to afford Indians or tribes any less protection for their constitutional
rights than anyone else.
While a detailed solution to these problems is beyond the scope of
this Article, it is clear that denigrating legal fictions, such as Johnson’s
holding that the United States gained underlying fee title to tribal
lands by virtue of discovering them and Tee-Hit-Ton’s holding that the
United States does not owe tribes Fifth Amendment compensation
for the taking of aboriginal title because tribes are conquered
peoples, must be eschewed. Moreover, limitations on tribal jurisdiction, such as those effected by Oliphant and Long Family Land & Cattle,
that are implicitly grounded on notions of tribal untrustworthiness
with respect to outsiders likely stem from racialized conceptions of
Indians and should be regarded as inherently suspect. Although justice for tribes and Indians may be difficult to even envision in the face
of hundreds of years of largely unjust precedent and, in many cases,
positive law, we must dare to imagine it and then collectively demand
it of ourselves, our courts, and our government.

350

In the relatively rare case where a tribe’s right to self-government conflicted with an individual’s Constitutional right, one solution might be to define the tribe’s right to selfgovernment as a compelling interest. However, I am not suggesting that such a solution
be applied in the context of ICRA-based individual rights, which are statutory rather than
constitutional. A more thorough examination of this proposed solution would be necessary before it could be unequivocally supported.

